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Abstract
Among human rights abuses in modern society, the trafficking of women and children for
labor, prostitution, and other forms of sexual exploitation is one of the greatest. While a large
amount of time and financial support has gone into efforts to suppress trafficking and shelter its
victims, there has not been enough done to tackle this problem. Before reaching the age of 18, it
is predicted that 80% of adolescents in the United States will have traded money for sex. Many
adolescent girls who have been trafficked in the commercial sex industries are subject to serious
criminal penalties for prostitution-related offenses regardless of being forced or coerced to
commit these criminal acts against their will by either traffickers or pimps. At the present, more
juveniles are finding themselves being adjudicated for sexual solicitation than are being found
victims, and this outcome may be circumstantially based on a particular jurisdiction’s law. The
purpose of this study will be to examine the judicial response to adolescent female human
trafficking victims who are charged with the crime of prostitution. Specifically, how does the
justice system respond to these under-aged prostitutes who are victims of human trafficking?
Prior research has not looked at case law as a narrative source to unearth juridical decision
making and how justice is dispensed for trafficked girls charged with prostitution. As such, this
study applies a qualitative case law methodology that utilizes two layers of textual analysis to
identify leading jurisprudential intent and discover the underlying themes of judicial
temperament and convictions found within six court decisions, which make up the sample. Four
prevailing themes emerged from the analyses, which best convey the jurisprudential intent of
how and why the court ruled in these specific decisions. The four prevailing themes are: relief,
best interest, rehabilitation, and individual accountability. Implications for policy and practice, as
well as directions for future research, ensue from the discussion of these qualitative findings.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Among rights abuses in modern society, the trafficking of women and children for
labor, prostitution, and other forms of sexual exploitation is one of the greatest. While a large
amount of time and financial support has gone into efforts to suppress trafficking and shelter its
victims, there has not been enough done to tackle this problem. Since modern-day slavery
became an international criminal offense in 2000, the federal government, all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, and all U.S. territories have enacted human-trafficking legislation (Peters
2016). Furthermore, in 2017 the U.S. Department of Justice put forth $45 million to support
programs that help victims of human trafficking (U.S. Department of Justice, 2017; Williams,
2018, p. 628). While that has done much to help the fight against trafficking, more needs to be
done. For example, according to Polaris Project (2017), there have been 44,000 cases identified
in the United States through their helplines, but that is not the full breadth of the problem.
Underreporting of the problem can be due to lack of knowledge of the crime or the absence of
resources like helplines in certain regions of the country.
Before reaching the age of 18 it is estimated that 80% of adolescents in the United States
traded money for sex (Birkhead, 2011; Baird, 2019). Many adolescent girls who have been
trafficked in the commercial sex industry are subject to serious criminal penalties for
prostitution-related offenses that they were forced to commit. Victims of sex trafficking, who
commit acts of prostitution are most commonly controlled by a pimp. The traffickers find
adolescents easier to mold and shape (Barnard, 2014). Many of the victims are forced into acts of
prostitution through the use of physical and psychological acts, such as: sexual abuse,
brainwashing, beatings, and the confiscation of personal documents (Barnard, 2014).
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The bulk of individuals who are arrested for prostitution and loitering with the intent of
prostitution fit the legal precedent for sex trafficking (Mogulescu, 2012). This may be because
those who are most likely to be arrested for prostitution are street prostitutes, and are victims of
sex trafficking (Mogulescu, 2012). Furthermore, some documentation points to the fact that
some victims of trafficking are arrested specifically because they are victims of this crime,
simply so they can be coerced into sharing information about their sex trafficker (Barnard, 2014).
More problems are faced by victims, both, while being trafficked and after, if they are able to
escape their trafficker. While with their trafficker, victims are often told that an arrest on their
record will prevent them from gaining employment outside the sex industry (Mogulescu, 2012).
In a further attempt to keep them under their thumb, traffickers will tell their victims that no one
will believe them if they try and file a report against their trafficker because of their previous
record (Barnard, 2014; Mogulescu, 2012). True to what the traffickers tell their victims, a prior
arrest for prostitution can impede a victim’s chance at employment outside the industry.
Furthermore, it can prevent a victim from gaining public or private housing (Barnard, 2014). It
can also, interfere with the victim being considered a fit parent and can impede being seen as a
fit parent in custody disputes (Barnard, 2014). For those who are foreign, an arrest on their
record can effect their chances at getting legal immigration status (Mogulescu, 2012).
Currently, in the United States, it appears more juveniles are finding themselves being
adjudicated for sexual solicitation than are being found victims of human trafficking, and this
may be situationally based on a particular jurisdiction’s law (Adelson, 2008; Barnard, 2014).
Thus, a larger question has emerged, is the U.S. court system experiencing tension in whether to
protect or punish female youth arrested for prostitution who also claim to be victims of human
trafficking? Or has the judicial system convinced itself there is no moral tension that exists in
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these instances because punishment of the youth in question serves as a form of protection for
the youth individually and for the society at large? To date, there appears to be no study that
empirically assesses the jurisprudential intent that influences how judicial rulings are reached in
cases where adolescent girls who claim to be victims of human trafficking are charged with
prostitution. This study applies a qualitative textual analysis of existing case law to identify the
leading rationales, justifications, and perceptions used by the courts to determine if the youthful
defendant should receive punitive sanctions or granted relief as human trafficking victims.

4
Chapter Two: Literature Review
Historical Background
Not only is human trafficking not a new concept, in different ways, it is also related to
slavery. For instance, 30% to 40% of Imperial Rome was composed of slaves, brought in from
various other countries, such as, Germany, Gaul, Britain, and Thrace (Coolingridge, 2006; Logan
et al., 2009). Consequently, America has much experience in the ways of slavery. History shows
that starting in 1619, both White and African American slaves were imported there (Davis, 2006;
Jordan & Walsh, 2007). Eventually in 1807, a law abolished the importing of African slaves,
which ultimately led to a civil war against slavery from 1860 until1865. Between those years, in
1863, laws were created which abolished slavery (Logan et al., 2009).
Consequently, the slavery of our past transitioned into a new kind of slavery that exists
today, called human trafficking. Among the profitable criminal industries of this world, human
trafficking is considered the second highest. It generates around $31.6 billion in profits each year
(Baird, 2019). There is a law/act forbidding human trafficking called Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (TVPA). This act considers it illegal to “use force, fraud, or coercion to exploit a
person for profit or personal services” (Kim, 2007; Logan et al., 2007, 2009, p. 4). Under the
umbrella of human trafficking lies sex exploitation/trafficking and labor exploitation/trafficking.
Sex exploitation/trafficking involves “a commercial sex act induced by force, fraud, or coercion,
or in which the person induced to perform the sex acts is under 18 years of age” (Kim, 2007;
Logan et al., 2007, 2009, p. 4). Unlike other crimes, the trafficking of sex relies on the sexual
assault and brutality of someone else to gain a profit (Farley, 2006).. With the lack of legal
enforcement and the great financial gains to be made through the act of human trafficking, there
is little to deter traffickers from repeatedly violating the law (Heiges, 2006). With that
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understanding, there is little to deter the growth of this enterprise (Mir, 2013). Labor
exploitation/trafficking involves the use of “individuals to perform labor or services through the
use of force, fraud, or coercion” (Polaris, 2006).
How People Are Trafficked
Even though it is generally debated as to how many people are trafficked each year, a
comfortable number for most hovers around 40 million people across the world (Baird, 2019).
There are several ways that individuals end up in the world of trafficking: (a) born in to, (b)
taken, sold into trafficking, or unwillingly; or (c) tricked (Bales, 1999; Logan et al., 2009). In
some cases, unfortunate families, “have been slaves, or in debt bondage literally for generations”
(Logan et al., 2009, p. 11; Skinner, 2008). Debt bondage occurs when an individual incurs a debt
or a loan they cannot pay back right away, so they sell themselves into slavery until it is paid in
full. Sometimes the debt is never paid back, because it is continuing to grow while they are
paying it back (End Slavery Now, 2018). The second way to end up in the world of trafficking is
to be sold into it. Many families struggle to feed their families and have too many mouths to
feed. Parent’s or caregiver’s only available option is to sell off one of the children to make
money to pay off their debt (Logan et al., 2009). Being tricked by traffickers is the third way
individuals end up in the world of trafficking. Many individuals come to America looking for a
better life. That is what they believe they are getting when they are approached about a good
paying job, which may even involve signing a contract, but this is all a front (Logan et al., 2009).
For instance, “employment, modeling, and marriage agencies are used to attract potential
victims” (Hodge, 2008, p. 145-146; Hughes, 2004a). According to Baird (2019), “to gain control
of victims, traffickers employ a variety of control tactics, including physical and emotional
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abuse, sexual assault, confiscation of identification and money, isolation from friends and family,
and even renaming victims” (p. 344).
The conviction and prosecution of human traffickers not only fulfills a legal function
when done properly, but it is also necessary to protect the trafficker’s victim(s). However, one of
the legal complications of human trafficking is identifying trafficking victims. Providing services
to victims of human trafficking can be a problem, because they are able to hide under the radar.
Sometimes victims are identified by way of trained law enforcement officers who know how to
identify the situation, or it occurs during the course of an ongoing investigation (Clawson et al.,
2006; Free the Slaves, 2004; Logan, 2007; Logan et al., 2009). This makes awareness of human
trafficking essential, not just for service providers but for all citizens of the United States (Logan
et al., 2009).
Part of the problem with identifying victims is the lack of training. Police may be
restricted in their awareness of trafficking as well as their skill at recognizing and reacting to it
(Nichols & Heil, 2015; Tyldum & Brunovskis 2005). Another part of the problem is that, “the
justice system largely places responsibility for the police identification and reporting of
trafficking on the victims themselves” (Ugarte, Zarate, & Farley, 2003; Nichols & Heil, 2015, p.
10).
Victim Reporting
While this can complicate the situation greatly, some victims may not want to be
identified for a variety of reasons (Adams, 2011; Nichols & Heil, 2015). There are several
reasons that victims of human trafficking may not come forward. First the abuse both physical
and psychological can keep them from wanting to report their traffickers (Heil, 2012). Believing
that social service workers will disbelieve his or her claims, is another reason a victim may be
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reluctant to report their trafficker(s). Yet another reason not to come forward is fearing arrest
and/or lack of protection from authorities (Hodge, 2008). This fear extends to the likelihood that
they will be treated as criminals rather than recognized as victims of trafficking who were
coerced into prostitution (Hodge, 2008). Victims often fear “reprisals from traffickers, that
officers are crooked, that they don’t care, or are in cahoots with the traffickers themselves”
(Hodge, 2008, p. 148). It can often be difficult to get assistance from victims of trafficking since
they will frequently defend their abuser the way they would a partner or spouse. Additionally,
these girls are operating with their abuser, even though in most cases they are being forced to,
they do not believe others will see it that way. Their ultimate fear is law enforcement and
prosecution (Hanna, 2002). There is also the fear that if their trafficker does get arrested, he will
not stay in jail/prison long. Prosecutors cannot expect victims to testify against their trafficker if
he or she gets out shortly after being arrested (Hodge, 2008). Threats of harm to family
members, is yet another reason, a victim chooses not to report, (Logan et al., 2009). Still another
reason is isolation. For instance, monitoring their victim’s whereabouts and keeping them out of
the public eye, ensures the trafficker’s control over them (Logan et al., 2009). Fear of deportation
is yet even another reason found by researchers in Texas and Florida, that many victims
reconsider speaking up (Busch-Armendariz et al., 2009; Heil, 2012; Nichols & Heil, 2015).
Furthermore, many victims do not realize that they are actual victims of human trafficking, so
they do not seek out help. This is a result of what is known as “psychological paralysis, a
condition that makes them believe they cannot escape prostitution despite opportunities to do so,
thereby forcing them to accept their victimization” (Baird, 2019, p. 346).
However, when individuals do speak up, there are people out there who will listen to
them. For example, the National Trafficking Resource Center (Polaris, 2018) is a place that
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welcomes calls from victims and will do their best to help them. According to Polaris (2018), in
2017, the National Trafficking Resource Center had 8,524 human trafficking cases reported, and
their hotline got 26,557 calls; some of those calls were from victims and some were from
survivors.
Hodge (2008) suggested a way to bridge the gap between those who may identify and
those that can come to their aid. He thought that organizing teams of social workers, clergy,
immigration lawyers, and local and federal law enforcement officials would help bring people
together who are likely to identify potential victims. Additionally, the potential victims can be
connected with people who can provide “protective and rehabilitative services,” making the
transition from identification to protection a smooth one (p. 148).
Corruption/Collusion
When those with the power to influence and make decisions use it for negative selfish
means, it causes problems. For instance, the police, prosecutors and judges, have the power and
ability to choose and play their part in whether case has a shot at going to trial, how severe the
charges are, and how things ultimately are settled (McDonald, 2014). Furthermore, if a new
reform bill is trying to be pushed through, judges have the power to stop it in its tracks, should
they feel so inclined. This very situation occurred in the 1970s and 1980s when rape law reforms
were the current affair (McDonald, 2014). It was believed that the reform would have led to a
great number of arrests, prosecutions, and convictions for rape; however, that is not what
happened. Attorneys’ fears of jury confusion at the new offenses, victim’s lack of believability,
and possibility of conviction were a couple of reasons for the reform’s failure to succeed
(McDonald, 2014). Additionally, Heinrich and Shreeharsha (2013) did a study, which showed
that if local and state prosecutors refuse or are likely to refuse to prosecute a case on trafficking,
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then the local and state investigators are equally as unlikely or unwilling to pass cases in front of
their desks. If the chance of losing a case is not enough incentive to pass it up, there are other
ways to prevent the freedom for another victim.
All it potentially takes is the right amount of bribery and/or persuasive fear tactics to
sway an officer of the law, judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, etc., to bend to the will of the
trafficker. According to McDonald (2014), “There is a remarkable capacity of criminal courts to
adjust to and effectively thwart reforms” (p. 130). Hodge (2008) argues that advocacy strategies
need to focus on protecting victims, preventing efforts, and prosecuting traffickers.
Furthermore, statistics can be created by defenders to either authenticate, or to disprove,
the existence of trafficking in their individual towns. For instance, 64 hotline calls were recorded
in St. Louis, by the National Trafficking Resource Center in 2011, although only 24 of them,
based on legal indicators, were treated as potential trafficking situations (Nichols & Heil, 2015).
However, according to the U.S. Department of Justice (2016), “Other research ranks St. Louis as
number 18 on the list of ‘the most intense [top 20] trafficking jurisdictions in the country’” (p.
35). Ultimately, no one can agree on the pervasiveness of sex trafficking in the United States or
the city of St. Louis for that matter (Nichols & Heil, 2015). According to some scholars (BuschArmendariz et al., 2009; Farrell et al., 2012; Goodey, 2008; Kotrla, 2010; Rand 2009; Reid;
2010; Stransky & Finkelhor, 2008; Trohshynski & Blank, 2008; Nichols & Heil, 2015), when
working with an isolated and defenseless population, such as trafficking victims, variations in
estimates are anticipated. While no one questions the existence of human trafficking (McDonald,
2004), there is debate over the magnitude of the problem (Hodge, 2008).
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Enforcement of Laws
Sadly, as a result of being a victim of human trafficking, many are arrested and charged
with prostitution and other infractions (Meiers 2015):
With the enactment of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in 2000 (U.S.
Department of Justice, 2011), Congress committed the United States to join the latest in a
series of international campaigns (McDonald, 2004) to establish a global prohibition
regime (Nadelmann, 1990) against trafficking in persons for labor and sexual
exploitation. (McDonald, 2014, p. 126)
Unfortunately, the United States is not succeeding in finding help for “tens of thousands” of
victims according to an investigation done by the Kansas City Star (McGraw & Bauer, 2009,
McDonald, 2014, p. 125). That investigation revealed, “as of 2011, 7,206 sex trafficking and 508
labor trafficking prosecutions are estimated to have occurred. Also, in 2011, there is an estimated
4,239 convictions made for sex trafficking and 320 for labor trafficking. A total of 41,210
victims were identified (meaning not given in report)” (U.S. Department of State, 2012;
McDonald, 2014, p. 128). Furthermore, on a somber note, the penalty for trafficking a human
being is less than the penalty for trafficking drugs or weapons (Bertone, 2000; Raymond &
Hughes, 2001; Hodge, 2008).
Not only are murder investigations difficult when victims cannot be identified, but the
absence of concerned relatives, or anyone who is missing the trafficking victim, compounds the
difficulty (Logan et al., 2009). Cases likes these often involve difficult victims, unsympathetic
juries, and judges and prosecutors as authentic victims (McDonald, 2014).
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Prostitution Arrests
What drives the arrests of prostitutes is the desire to shield society and advocate a moral
code, (Javidian, 2003); in and of themselves, these catalysts are not dubious. However, these
ideas should back up and amplify age of consent laws, so that domestic juveniles are defended
from profiteering traffickers (Birkhead, 2011). Young minors need fresh legislation to shield
them from the victimization they deal with daily, (Hanna, 2002) and to deal with the unanswered
atrocities played out by their traffickers and their cronies (Heiges, 2006). While federal law is
supposed to shield and protect victims of sex trafficking and prevent them from facing criminal
charges that often fails to happen (Baird, 2019). Frequently, many states decline to use the laws
that are there to safeguard victims (Baird, 2019). Due to this miscarriage of justice, many victims
are charged and convicted of infractions committed because they were victims of human
trafficking (Baird, 2019).
Part of the reason victims of sexual exploitation/trafficking are often not considered
genuine is due to them having been arrested for prostitution, when they have actually been forced
into the life. For instance, Logan (2009) states, “Many victims are forced to commit criminal acts
themselves (e.g., prostitution involvement, illegal activities, drug use, or using false documents)
and are afraid to come forward” (p. 6). This type of situation makes visibility for the trafficking
victim very difficult. A cop would need to know they are dealing with a victim, but how, when
by all appearances they look like a prostitute? The only exception would be someone who is
under-aged. Moreover, the world of human trafficking is quite hidden from anyone who doesn’t
know what to look for (Logan et al., 2009). In the case where the prostitute is a minor, according
to Hoatling et al., (2006), 12 to 13 years of age is when the act of prostitution begins on average.
Often, once recognized by the police these minors are charged with violating the law, placed in
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jail, and then eventually let go, often back into the arms of their trafficker/victimizer (Lustig,
2007). Even though the TVPA considers juveniles who perform sex acts to be victims, there are
still prosecutors and judges that are charging them with prostitution, rather than seeing them as
victims of sexual exploitation (Mir, 2013). While acknowledgement that juveniles who are
prostituted are not criminals and are in fact victims, has garnered attention federally with
connection to “foreign national juveniles,” juveniles of the domestic persuasion are not currently
given similar treatment, or offered the same services (Brittle, 2008, p. 2). Regardless that these
youth have been hurt many times over and preyed upon by their parents, hustlers, and “johns”
and, according to statutory rape provisions, are unable to consent to sexual activity, they are
being prosecuted, locked up, and released back to the streets for more abuse (Hansen, 2001;
Brittle, 2008, p. 2).
Prostituted Juveniles
While great attention and care is being paid to human trafficking victims in other
countries around the world, (Raymond & Hughes, 2001), there is a lack of concern within the
United States for our victims here (Kristoph, 2011). Among contemporary democratic countries
in the world, only in the United States are the greater number of trafficking victims its own
people (Heiges, 2006). The current issue among prostituted minors in the United States is the
imaginary line that is drawn between domestic minors and foreign national minors, and the
attention that each receives from the police, prosecution, and social services (Kittling, 2006).
Even though each is in the same age group, has endured similar types of sexual and physical
abuse, socioeconomic challenges and torture, only “foreign national youth brought into the
United States,” coerced into prostitution are viewed as “victims of sex trafficking” (Lustig, 2007;
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Brittle, 2008, p. 2), while domestic youth in the same predicament are considered criminals
(Cecil, 2005).
Domestic Prostituted Juveniles
Due to the lack of a powerful “national domestic trafficking policy” (Klain, 1999; Brittle,
2008, p. 3), the act of prostitution by juveniles’ is generally dealt with as a violation against a
states’ own penal code (Brittle, 2008). Once law enforcement is made aware of them, these
infractions are addressed by the adult criminal or the juvenile justice system (Hanna, 2002).
A juvenile can be between the ages of 15 and 17, and still be directed by the juvenile
justice system; however, there are statutory exceptions for particular offenses, where the youth
will be sent to the adult system (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). Social service agencies may be
made aware of youth who are attended to by the juvenile system. Furthermore, the minor’s
position in life may be looked in to with interest (Hanna, 2002). Regardless of their age or the
torture they have endured, domestic juveniles are still often looked at as though they were adult
committing an act of prostitution or as a juvenile delinquent. Whichever view law enforcement
sides with, it still means lock up, of some form for the juvenile (Heiges, 2006).
When an act of juvenile prostitution occurs, law enforcement will be the department to
step forward and act first. Furthermore, because of the nature of prostitution, law enforcement is
more likely to be aware that juvenile prostitution is occurring than other agencies (Bova Conti &
O’Connor, 2005). Due to being unsure how to handle juvenile offenders or having a lack of
experience, law enforcement may decide to not place charges on youth apprehended for
prostitution. This choice is an attempt to avoid having to associate with the social service agency
or the juvenile justice system (Finklehorn & Ormond, 2004). Allowing this form of corruption to
continue is only aiding the pimps and traffickers in their exploitation of (Brittle, 2008).
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According to Evans (2004), youth may either be placed in a lockdown facility or go with child
protective services (CPS) and end up in a foster home, or a care facility for groups. If there is a
lack of inclusive services to tend to the complicated requirements of prostituted youth, then the
likelihood of these juveniles remaining at their placements is low. Many are likely to runaway
(Evans, 2004; Hanna, 2002; Lustig, 2007). Furthermore, many of these youth are skeptical of
social service agencies and law enforcement (Kreston, 2000), which makes intervention between
groups and the youth needing help ardous (Brittle, 2008).
Foreign Prostituted Juveniles
The government has made progress over the years in distinguishing that prostituted
minors trafficked into the United States are in fact exploited juveniles, and not criminals (Hanna,
2002; Kittling, 2006; Tanagho, 2007). This focus was furthered by the use of the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act (TVPA) “ of 2000 (22 U.S.C. §§7101) and its consecutive rewrites in
2003 and 2005, (Pub. L. No.109-164, 119 Stat. 3558; Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875)
Congress denounced human trafficking” (22 U.S.C. §7101(b)(23)).
Victims of exploitation are protected whether they were forced, fraudulently enticed or
coerced by their trafficker. This is because it is well known that victims cannot give consent to
being trafficked (Hanna, 2002). The addition of governmental care and help for victims of
trafficking is a great achievement (Tangagho, 2007).
Foreign national victims of trafficking are supplied with far-reaching and inclusive
services (Caliber, 2007). However, whether the prostituted juvenile is considered domestic or
foreign certain forms of aid are imperative. Included in the essential forms of aid are: shelter for
the juveniles, first aid, safeguarding from their trafficker and financial assistance to remain afloat
while their situation gets sorted out (§7105(c)(3)).
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Unequal treatment for same level of abuse
Whether foreign or domestic prostituted juveniles are taken advantage of by traffickers in
the same fashion, both have been strong armed into acts of prostitution against their will, through
the use of lies and control (Hoatling, 2006). While foreign and domestic prostituted juvenile
share similar trafficking stories, their stories change drastically as soon as law enforcement
becomes involved. The way each group is treated can be compared to night and day. While one
is viewed as immoral and a law breaker (Finkelhorn & Ormrod, 2004) the other is considered a
victim who has been abused and needs assistance (Hoatling, 2006). An example of this could be,
“when a prostituted foreign national juvenile is placed in a safe form of shelter (22
U.S.C.§7105(c)(1)), and a prostituted domestic juvenile is sealed up in confinement (Lustig,
2007).
The reason for the variances in the way foreign nationals and domestic minors are
handled has to do with an arduous entanglement of psychological, legal, and social
considerations. Federal law is responsible for foreign nationals due to foreign policy and
immigration affairs (Hanna, 2002). When things are handled this way, the chances that services
rendered and provided to the youth will be the same or similar across the board (Caliber, 2007).
Depending on the jurisdiction in which a domestic national is apprehended will determine what
state laws will be applicable to the youth (Langley, 2005). Due to localized state agencies
handling these situations, the way the youth are treated can vary greatly from one jurisdiction to
the next. With the age limit varying depending on the state, as to what qualifies a youth to be
included in the juvenile justice system, (Synder & Sickmund, 2006) as well as its specific laws
and ways of handling cases of youth prostitution, a domestic youth accused of prostitution may
face different treatment in one state compared to another (Brittle, 2008).
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One determinant that makes a difference in how some youth are treated is his or her
general mental outlook. The fear of being sent back to their country of origin keeps foreign
youth leery and fearful of interacting with police. For the youth that come from countries that are
severely harsh towards prostituting, this fear is compounded (Young, 1998).
On the other hand, for social workers and police who attempt to persuade domestic youth
to abandon their victimizer, they may be faced with opposition and aggressiveness (Klain, 1999;
Kreston, 2000). Often, even when minors are faced with the opportunity to vacate their situation,
the mental link they have to their deeply rooted lifestyle is so great that they cannot do it
(Hoatling, 2006).
Unfortunately, since trafficking numbers are hard to estimate, it only seems like a
problem to some. Without consistent numbers, the funding and training necessary for law
enforcement and legal aid, just to name a few, will not happen. At least not in the magnitude
necessary to make a difference. For example, Logan (2007) argues that there is a great need for
more education, a more reactionary approach, training, and policies and procedures to serve
victims better (Logan, 2009). According to Flowers (2001), it is approximated that somewhere
between 100,000 and 3 million children below the age of 18 are operating in prostitution rings;
however, to know exactly how many American girls have been drawn into prostitution
movements is quite a complicated feat to tackle. To add to the problem of estimates, law
enforcement is often not even aware that juveniles are being exploited sexually. Police were only
able to draw a link between the hiring of teenage runaways by “dance parties” with sex
corporations, in Greensboro, North Carolina, after the creation of a task unit focused on
prostitution (Swoffard, 2002).
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Safe Harbor Laws
One thing that has been done in the U.S. to move in the right direction is Safe Harbor
Laws. “The crime of human trafficking has received much political and media attention in recent
years. Lawmakers and actors within the criminal justice system have yet to fully grasp the
challenges human trafficking victims face in securing the rights, benefits, services, and
protections reserved for this group” (Peters 2016). In order to stop the cycle of exploitation and
the revictimization of trafficked youth seven states, including; Connecticut, Illinois, New York,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Vermont, and Washington, (Mir, 2013) have passed Safe Harbor
legislation, which identifies minors as victims of commercial exploitation (Adelson, 2008).
Furthermore, Safe Harbor Laws allocate amnesty to minors who are caught in the throes of
human trafficking (Baird, 2019). Centered around the victim, Safe Harbor laws focus on
removing the criminalization that victims of sex trafficking endure when picked up for
prostitution. These laws accommodate victims by giving them various forms of aid, such as;
intervention for crises, placement in safe environments, and other forms of aid that fit the needs
of each sexually exploited juvenile (Adelson, 2008). However, even though there have been a
few academics who have explained why states should be interested in approving laws that will
help victims of trafficking, as well as provided examples of ways this could work, there has been
little to no reaction from the states (Baird, 2019). Baird (2019) believes that the public requires
education as to how sex trafficking works in the United States, how to identify victims, and who
is likely to become a victim.
Purpose of the Current Study
At the present, more juveniles are finding themselves being adjudicated for sexual
solicitation than are being found victims, and this outcome may be situationally based on a
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particular jurisdiction’s law (Adelson, 2008). Those juvenile prostitutes who are domestic get
victimized twice as bad as foreign juvenile prostitutes. The minor is first attacked by their
trafficker or hustler, and then the judicial system takes them for a ride, when they are supposed
to be protecting them and keeping them safe (Harrington, 2010). In effort to annul the current
issues juvenile prostitutes are dealing with, and in order to keep them safe, other states may need
to follow New York’s lead and pass Safe Harbor laws. Doing so might help actualize the belief
of amnesty in the prostituted juvenile and help them get the aid they so desperately need, and/or
a delinquency petition depending on the individual juvenile’s situation (Mir, 2013).
Therefore, the purpose of this study will be to examine the judicial response to adolescent
female human trafficking victims who are charged with the crime of prostitution. Specifically,
how does the justice system respond to these under aged prostitutes who are victims of human
trafficking? Are the courts primarily punitive or do they take into account the victim status of
these trafficked youth and permit them relief from delinquent or criminal charges? Prior research
has not looked at case law as a narrative source to unearth juridical decision-making and how
justice is dispensed for trafficked girls charged with prostitution. As such, this study applies a
qualitative case law methodology that utilizes two layers of textual analysis to identify leading
jurisprudential intent and discover the underlying themes of judicial temperament and
convictions found within these court decisions. The findings, while exploratory, can hopefully be
used to build upon theory, illuminate potential policy implications, and construct new research
questions and hypothesis for future research.
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Chapter Three: Methodology
This study conducted a qualitative examination of the rationales and justifications for
why female youthful offenders, who are charged with prostitution, are either treated punitively or
leniently as victims of human trafficking. Court cases, within the past 10 years, which address
the arrest of adolescent girls charged with prostitution who have been victims of human
trafficking were examined. Specific sampling criteria were used to isolate the cases that will be
textually analyzed in this study. First, a search of Westlaw Campus Research was conducted
using key terms. The terms included, human trafficking victim, charged with prostitution, minor,
girl, adolescent, and due process. The term “human trafficking victim” was used because the
focus of this investigation is on victims of trafficking. However, the term “charged with
prostitution” was added to the search query because this study is interested in understanding how
victims of trafficking are treated when criminally charged with the crime of prostitution. The
next terms added to the query were minor, girl, and adolescent. These terms were added to the
criteria in order to narrow down the results of the cases to include only those dealing with female
minors or adolescents who have been trafficked as well as arrested for prostitution. Lastly, the
term “due process” was added to the query in an effort to capture court cases that explored
whether the due process rights of these youth were adequately taken into account. These terms
used were used all together because of the results they yielded. These particular terms, when
used by themselves, produced too many results and/or results that were not focused on the girls
as victims, and instead focused on the trafficker themselves. So these six specific terms were
added to the query, which yielded six cases that fit the purposive criteria for the sample. The
cases that the search yielded include the following: The People of the State of New York vs
L.G.(2013), In re Aarica S (2014), In re N.C. (2016), People v. G.M. (2011), People v. Samantha
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R. (2011), and In re M.D. (2014). All six of these cases met the criteria for query because each
involved an adolescent girl who was trafficked against her will and charged with prostitution for
working in the sex trade.
In order to examine these cases several questions were posed that helped to assess the
judicial decisions made in the cases involving these young girls. The following 8 questions were
asked about each of the cases:
1) What are the dimensions of attitudes or perceptions that are held?
2) What factors underlie particular attitudes or perceptions?
3) Why are decisions or actions taken, or not taken?
4) Why do particular needs arise?
5) Why are services or programs not being used, or are used?
6) What are the goals, purposes, and concerns of the decisions or actions taken, or not
taken?
7) What needs of society are represented by the decisions or actions taken, or not taken?
8) What are the differences in the arrests made for foreign adolescent victims of
trafficking as opposed to domestic adolescent victims of trafficking?
Through posing these questions to each case in the sample, the intended aim was to glean
a better understanding of how juvenile prostitution cases are adjudicated when the defendant is
also a victim of human trafficking. The first two questions sought to discover what attitudes and
perceptions are conveyed through the judicial decisions in regards to the culpability of trafficked
adolescent girls who are arrested for prostitution. Additionally, these first two questions intended
to explore factors that may influence such attitudes or perceptions to arise. The third question
was aimed at figuring out why the judge decided to make one choice and not another. For
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example, the judge may decide to give the adolescent probation instead of sending her to secure
confinement. Or perhaps the case is dismissed in lieu of mitigating circumstances due to the
trafficking claim and victim services are applied to the youth. This inquiry hopes to elucidate
whether victims of trafficking are treated with leniency or harshness. The fourth question probes
whether specific needs of the defendant, the court, or society at large are taken in account to
justify decisions made. For instance, one girl may need to be protected from retribution from her
former pimp, when she is allowed to go free. If she is not given some form of protection, she
may be harmed or worse. Question 5 will explore if sanctions are recommended for a youthful
defendant and whether those sanctions are rehabilitative or punitive in nature. Also, this question
will examine in any services are offered to address the youth’s victimization or not. Questions 6
and 7 will assess the needs, rationales, justifications, and purpose underpinning why particular
decisions were made or action were taken in each case. For example, was the decision to
adjudicate the youth and sentence her to secure confinement made out of a patriarchal concern
for controlling her sexuality, a legal moralism concern over public health and public safety in
regards to sexual crimes, or a paternalistic concern geared toward protecting the youth from
exposure to perceived immoral behavior? Lastly, Question 8 will evaluate if there is disparity in
how lenient or harsh the court’s ruling based on the youthful defendant’s national origin (i.e.,
native or foreign born).
A recently developed case law methodology (see, Arrigo, Bersot, & Sellers, 2011; Sellers
& Arrigo, 2009; Sellers & Arrigo, 2018), which consists of two levels or stages of textual
analysis was conducted to collect qualitative data and analyze it. The application of this method
abided by a “justifiability-of-interpretation” attitude throughout the data-mining procedure rather
than relying on quantitative validity and reliability checks common in codable quantitative
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content analyses (Sellers & Arrigo, 2018, p. 523). Thus, to avoid the researcher’s tendency to
impose any arbitrariness, subjectivity, or bias that is not already grounded in the data, the logics
of transparency, conformability, communicability, and coherence reinforced all interpretable
justifications (Sellers & Arrigo, 2018).
This method necessitates a careful re-reading of the legal texts with the aim of identifying
jurisprudential intent and unearthing the underlying themes of judicial temperament and
convictions found within these court cases (Sellers & Arrigo, 2018). The first level of textual
analysis entails the researcher using the eight research questions to guide an examination of the
plain decisional meaning of particular terms, phrases, or passages within the set of court
decisions from the sample. Text segments that represent respective responses to these guiding
research questions, were documented as evidence of the plain meaning of the underlying
jurisprudential intent rooted within each court decision. Any evidence that failed to support a
research question was also documented at this stage to achieve confirmability. The textual data
(manifest content) collected from the first level of analysis was next to undergo a second level of
analysis requiring an intratextual and intertextual investigation of emergent jurisprudential
themes within and across the court cases (Sellers & Arrigo, 2018). In this second level of data
collection and analysis, repetitively conveyed legal language was identified to reveal intratextual
and intertextual themes of jurisprudential intent, which reflect the court’s attitudes, convictions,
perceptions, rationales, and justifications for how decisions are reached in cases where
adolescent girls who are trafficked are judged when charged with prostitution (Sellers & Arrigo,
2018). The emergent themes guiding the judicial intent of these court decisions were critiqued
for their constitutional soundness, compliance/noncompliance with existing human trafficking
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legislation (TVPA), and whether the rights of exploited victims of human trafficking are upheld.
Implications for policy and practice ensued from the discussion of the qualitative findings.
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Chapter Four: Results
There were six court cases that made up the qualitative data set for two levels of textual
analysis in this study. Three of the court cases originated out of the State of New York, and three
originated out of the State of California. A brief description of these cases, which includes the
case background and the court’s ruling summarily, follows:
Summaries of Case Files
(1) The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff v. G.M., Defendant (2011)
Background (New York Case—defendant is foreign born/non-U.S. citizen). The
defendant, a native of the Dominican Republic, had been recognized by a federal agency as a
victim of human trafficking and provided the court with a very compelling narrative of the
circumstances surround all of her arrests, demonstrating that they were the product of years of
brutal physical, psychological, and sexual violence by her husband, which resulted in her having
been trafficked by him. During a five-month span, from September 1997 through January 1998,
defendant G.M. was arrested on six separate occasions, twice each from prostitution, criminal
trespass, and drug possession. As a result of the guilty pleas taken in each of these cases, she was
ultimately convicted of two violations and four class B misdemeanors. The defendant now
moves to vacate these convictions pursuant to criminal procedure law §440.101 on the grounds
that, among other things, she was a trafficking victim at the time these offenses occurred. On
April 1, 2011, this court issued an oral ruling granting the defendant’s motion to vacate the
convictions and dismissing the accusatory instruments, indicating that the written decision would
follow.
G. M. Court’s Decision. The motion to vacate charges was granted for G.M.
1

A 440 motion to vacate a criminal conviction is a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Article 440 of the
New York Criminal Procedure Law.
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(2) The People of the State of New York v. Samantha R., Defendant (2011)
Background (New York Case—defendant is U.S. Citizen). The defendant is a 16-year
old with no criminal history who is charged with the offense of loitering for the purpose of
prostitution. The charge is a non-criminal violation punishable by no more than fifteen days jail.
When she appeared before me in the arraignment part she was also the subject of a warrant that
had issued out of family court. The accusatory instrument pertinently alleges that Police Officer
Albert Q. Dodson: “Observed the defendant remain in or wander about a public place for twenty
minutes, during which defendant repeatedly beckoned to passers-by and stopped two passers-by,
engaging in conversation with said passers-by; stop only males passers-by and defendant did not
beckon to or converse with female passers-by during the same period…; standing in the middle
of the road while beckoning to motorists…Defendant stated, in substance, “I was coming home
from a party with my cousin.” At defendant’s arraignment, I addressed sua sponte whether I
should dismiss this prosecution both as an exercise of my interest-of-justice power and in light of
the recently enacted Safe Harbor2 for Exploited Children Act (the “Safe Harbor Act”) (as added
by L 2008, ch 569 {eff Apr. 1 2010]), which I read to express the intent of the Legislature that
16- and 17-year-olds who are charged with prostitution offenses should be referred to Family
Court rather than prosecuted criminally. The People requested an opportunity to address my
proposed dismissal in writing, even though I noted that the legislative sponsors to the Safe
Harbour Act believed that the mere pendency of criminal charges against these children was
itself harmful.”
Samantha R. Court’s Decision. The case was dismissed by the judge.
(3) The People of the State of New York v L.G. (2013)
2

A safe harbor is a provision in a law or regulation that affords protection from liability or penalty under specific
situations, or if certain conditions are met that specifies that certain conduct will be deemed not to violate a given
rule. Sometimes a safe harbor reduces liability if "good faith" is demonstrated.
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Background (New York Case—defendant is U.S. Citizen). L.G. claims her prior
convictions are directly related to her arrests for prostitution offenses, and that because she is a
victim of human trafficking, those convictions must be vacated and the cases dismissed.
Defendant also argues that she was denied effective assistance of counsel when she pleaded
guilty in each case. L.G. was convicted in the criminal court of the city of New York, Queens
County of disorderly conduct and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and was
sentenced to a term of probation. L.G. moved to vacate judgment based on her alleged status as a
sex trafficking victim. The people argue that L.G’s second conviction for criminal possession of
a weapon should not be vacated because it is not a prostitution related charge, and as a matter of
public policy, CPL 440 should not grant greater protection to human trafficking victims in
weapons cases. They also assert that the defendant failed to seek relief under CPL 440 with due
diligence because she filed her motion three years after she ceased to fear her trafficker in 2008,
and a year after CPL 440 was amended in 2010 to allow relief for human trafficking victims.
L.G. was first arrested when she was 14 years old. In 2010, New York became the first state in
the country to pass a law, which allows defendants to vacate their prior convictions, which
resulted from their experiences as victims of human trafficking.
L.G. Court’s Decision. Judgments of conviction were vacated for L.G. (favorable to
defendant).
(4) The People, Plaintiff and Respondent v, Aarica S., Defendant and Appellant (2014)
Background (California Case—defendant is U.S. Citizen). A petition was filed
alleging that 17-year-old minor solicited prostitution. The Superior Court, Los Angeles, No.
MJ20515, Catherine J. Pratt found true allegations of the petition, sustained the petition and
declared the minor to be a ward of the court. In the Court of Appeal, Willhite, J. held that
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evidence supported juvenile court’s determination that Aarica S. was not a victim of human
trafficking in relation to the solicitation of prostitution at issue. Aarica S. appeals from an order
of wardship following the finding that she committed the crime of soliciting prostitution.
Appellant contends that because she was a victim of human trafficking, the juvenile court erred
in denying her motion under Evidence Code section 1161 subdivision (a), to exclude evidence
that she committed a commercial sex act, namely the solicitation of prostitution underlying the
wardship petition.
The court holds that Evidence Code Section 1161, subdivision (a), applies only when there is a
specific causal connection between the person’s status as a victim of human trafficking and the
commission of the commercial sex act at issue.
Aarica S. Court’s Decision. Prior court’s decision affirmed (unfavorable to defendant).
(5) The People, Plaintiff and Respondent v. N.C., Defendant and Appellant (2016)
Background (California Case—Defendant is U.S. Citizen). The juvenile charged with
prostitution in the delinquency proceeding filed motion to exclude evidence under Proposition
35, the Californians Against Sexual Exploitation Act (CASE Act), claiming she was a victim of
human trafficking. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, No. PJ51576, Robert J. Schuit J.,
denied motion. Juvenile appealed and matter was transferred to the superior court, Costa County,
for disposition. The Court of Appeal, P.J. Kline held that CASE Act Statute declaring that
evidence that a victim of human trafficking engaged in a commercial sexual act as a result of
human trafficking is inadmissible to prove liability for that act applies in juvenile delinquency
proceedings, and as a matter of first impression, CASE Act Statute applies to uncompensated
sexual conduct.
N.C. Court’s Decision. Court reversed lower court’s ruling (favorable to defendant).
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(6) The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M.D., Defendant and Appellant (2014):
Background (California Case—defendant is a U.S. Citizen). After petition was filed to
adjudicate the minor as ward of the juvenile court for alleged misdemeanor violation of loitering
with intent to commit prostitution, the minor filed motion in limine to exclude evidence of her
alleged commercial sexual activity on ground that she was a victim of human trafficking.
The Superior Court, Contra Costa County, Lewis A. Davis, denied the motion, and following
jurisdictional hearing, he declared the minor a ward of the juvenile court and placed her on
probation. Minor appealed. Holdings included:
1) As a matter of first impression, procedural fairness did not support reallocation of
burden of proof.
2) Public policy did not support reallocation of burden of proof.
3) Evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to show the minor was a victim of human
trafficking.
4) Failure of counsel to present additional evidence did not prejudice minor
Opinion (Pollak, J.). A minor appeals from an order of wardship following a finding that
she committed the crime of loitering that the juvenile court erred in denying her in limine motion
to exclude evidence under Evidence Code Section 1161 on the ground that she committed the
alleged commercial sex act as a result of being a victim of human trafficking. Alternatively, she
contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in presenting her motion and that two
conditions of her probation are unconstitutionally vague. The court found no error in the denial
of her motion and no merit in her alternative arguments. The court affirms the prior courts
orders.
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M.D. Court’s Decision. The court affirmed the lower court’s ruling (unfavorable for
defendant).
Next, the data collected for both levels of qualitative analysis will now be presented for
each case. The raw data for Level I textual analysis is reported in Appendix B and raw data for
Level II thematic analysis are reported in Appendix C. The first level of textual analysis
identifies key words, phrases, or entire passages that reflect the plain meaning, as guided by the
eight research questions, for the jurisprudential intent expressed in these six court decisions.
Below, the selected examples of the textual data produced from the first level of analysis are
listed for each research question across all six court cases examined. Following the reporting of
the Level I textual results, the Level II thematic results are presented. The second layer of
analysis builds upon the first by unearthing underlying themes that emerge from the language
and concepts convey through the plain meaning data produced at the Level I textual analysis
within individual cases and across all six cases examined. Level II results, presented below list
text segments, phrases, or entire passages are that are representative of major themes that
surfaced in the decision-making process for each court case. There were four themes that
consistently appeared within or across the courts decisions evaluated in the study and they
include: best interest, relief, rehabilitation, and individual accountability. The results for each
level of analysis are presented below.
Level I Analysis
In the case of, The People of the State of New York v. L.G (2013), Research Question 1
reveals the dimensions of attitudes or perceptions that are held, involve the court wanting to
make sure all the details relating to each conviction are examined before they decide to vacate
said convictions. For example, consider the following passage:
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“In order for the court to exercise its discretion to consider vacatur of each of the
defendant’s judgments of conviction, the court must examine the unique factual
circumstances pertaining to each conviction” (p. 442).
For Research Question 2, the factors which underlie particular attitudes and perceptions of the
court are two-fold. The court felt the defendant needs to show that she was a trafficking victim at
the time of her arrest and that the charge she was convicted of was the result of her having been
trafficked. Thus, the court opined that:
“The movant must establish that (1) she was a trafficking victim at the time of her arrest,
and (2) her conduct or “participation in the offense” leading to her arrest resulted from
her being trafficked” (p. 436).
As for Research Question 3, the decisions or actions taken or not taken involve 3 passages. The
first regards the court agreeing L.G. was a victim of trafficking at the time of both of her arrests,
but that her second conviction should not be vacated. For example, consider the following
passage:
“The people do not contest either to defendant’s status or the circumstances surrounding
both of her arrests; only that her second conviction should not be subject to vacatur under
this statute” (p. 437).
The second passage touches on the decision of whether L.G.’s conviction for a non-prostitution
offense, which was the result of having been trafficked, can be vacated. For example, consider
the following passage:
“The only disputed issue in this case is whether defendant’s conviction for nonprostitution offense, which was the direct result of her having been forced into sex
trafficking, may be vacated under CPL 440.10(1)(i)” (p. 437).

31
The third passage explains that the court feels L.G.’s conviction for possession of a weapon
should be vacated because her participation in the offense was the direct result of her having
been trafficked. Thus, the court opined the following:
“This court holds that L.G.’s conviction for possession of a weapon in the fourth degree
falls within the ambit of the vacatur statute because her participation in that offense was
undeniably connected to the coerced trafficking activity which led to her arrest on
prostitution related charges and should therefore be vacated” (p. 437).
As for Research Question 4, the particular needs that arise include L.G. being in school and
wanting to move forward with her life. Convictions on her record would cause a road block for
her and would likely impede her employment in the future. For example, consider the following
passage:
“Defendant is currently a student at Medgar Evers College, and expects to graduate in
2014 with a bachelor’s degree in public administration and social work. She avers that
she wants “to vacate my convictions so that I can move forward with my life and career
without being held back by my past”” (p. 434).
In regards to Research Question 5, the services being used include the GEMS program. L.G.
took part in the program back when she was 14. The provided her with support and counseling.
Several years later after leaving prostitution she returned to GEMS as an active member.
Furthermore, she took part in their education initiative program and several therapy groups,
before returning to school. For example, consider the following passage:
“L.G. had previously been mandated by the family court to participate in the GEMS
program 8 back in 2001 when she was 14 years old. As a result, she received support and
counseling from them. After leaving prostitution in 2004 she reconnected with GEMS
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and became an active member, participating in the educational initiative program and in
various therapy groups before starting back to school again” (p. 434).
For question six, the concerns of the court regard the suffering of trafficked people. They don’t
feel those who have been trafficked should continue to endure pain for things they were forced to
do against their will. For example, consider the following passage: “Trafficked persons should
not suffer ongoing punishment for acts they committed unwillingly under coercion (Id)” (p. 438).
No data was ascertained for research questions seven and eight.
In the case of The People of the State of New York v. G.M. (2011), Research Questions 1
and 2 reveal the dimensions of attitudes or the perceptions that are held, as well as what factors
underlie those particular attitudes or perceptions, can be addressed in the following passage. In
this passage, the court found the defendant had suffered years of victimization at the hands of her
husband/pimp, all of which led to her arrest:
“Moreover, the defendant has provided a very compelling narrative of the circumstances
surrounding all of her arrests, demonstrating that they were the product of years of brutal
physical, psychological and sexual violence by her husband, which resulted in having
been trafficked by him” (p. 280).
For Research Question 3, decisions or actions that were taken in regard to G.M. involved the
court deciding that all of her convictions should be vacated, and the case dismissed. Consider the
following passage:
“This court concurs with the People’s position that all of the defendant’s convictions are
entitled to the relief requested. Thus, under the provision of the new amendment, this
court “must vacate the judgment and dismiss the accusatory instrument[.]” (CPL
440.10[6].)” (p. 280-281).
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As for Research Question 4, the particular need that arose for G.M. was the safety of her children
and herself. She explains that she was forced to take part in illegal dealings, which included
prostitution. If she refused, threat of harm to herself or her children in the Dominican Republic
was held over her head. Consider the following passage:
“…D.S. forced her to engage in these illegal activities, including prostitution, upon threat
of physical harm or actual violence if she did not comply. …If she refused to comply
with any of his demands, he would threaten to kill her or harm her children in the
Dominican Republic” (id. at 9)” (p. 276).
For Research Question 5, the services and or programs that G.M. used included outside
organizations, which helped her to reclaim her life. Consider the following passage:
“The defendant eventually sought assistance from outside organizations to help her put
her life back together, and in 2009, she received a “T Visa” (T – 1 Nonimmigrant
Classification Status), after proving to the federal government that she was a victim of
human trafficking” (p. 277).
As for Research Question 6, the concerns of the court in this instance are that the new legislation
allows for the defendant’s conviction to be dropped if the charge was prostitution or loitering, for
the purpose of committing a prostitution offense as a result of being a victim of human
trafficking. Consider the following passage:
Specifically, this new legislation allows for vacatur of convictions where the underlying
charge was for prostitution (Penal Law [“PL”] § 230.00) or loitering for the purpose of
engaging in a prostitution offense (PL § 240.37) and the defendant’s arrest on that charge
“was a result of having been a victim of sex trafficking under section 230.34 of the penal
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law or trafficking in persons under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (United States
Code, title 22, chapter 78)[.] (CPL 440.10[1][i].). (p. 279)
No research data was ascertained for Research Questions 7 and 8.
In the case of The People of the State of New York v. Samatha R. (2011), Research
Questions 1 and 2 revealed the dimensions of attitudes or perceptions that are held, and what
factors underlie those particular attitudes and perceptions. They are explained in the following
sentences. The court believes the interpretation of the recently enacted Safe Harbor for Exploited
Children Act implies that 16- to 17-year-olds who have been charged with prostitution offenses
should be sent to the Family court rather than prosecuted criminally. Consider the following
passage:
“At the defendant’s arraignment, I addressed sua sponte whether I should dismiss this
prosecution both as an exercise of my interest-of-justice power and in light of the recently
enacted Safe Harbour for Exploited Children Act (the “Safe Harbour Act”) (as added by
L 2008, ch 569 [eff Apr. 1, 2010]), which I read to express the intent of the Legislature
that 16- and 17-year-olds who are charged with prostitution offenses should be referred to
Family Court rather than prosecuted criminally” (p. 1).
As for Research Question 3, the decisions of the court include not feeling that handing out a
sentence on Samatha R. is a good idea, and that doing so would do more harm than good.
Consider the following passage:
“Fifth, I find that there would be little purpose in imposing a sentence on the defendant
and that the effect of any such sentence would do more harm than good” (p. 6).
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For question four, the particular needs that arise are the prevention of further pain and suffering
for Samatha R. In addition, she should be treated as a victim and given protection and services to
help her reacclimate to society. Consider the following three passages:
Arresting, prosecuting and incarcerating victimized youth serves to re-traumatize them
and to increase their feelings of low self-esteem. This only makes the process of recovery
more difficult.
Appropriate services for sexually exploited youth do not exist in the juvenile justice
system and both federal and international law recognize that sexually exploited youth are
victims of crime and should be treated as such.
Sexually exploited youth deserve the protection and services of the family court through
processes in place for persons in need of supervision, including diversion, crisis
intervention, counseling, and emergency and long-term housing services. (p. 1)
As for Research Question 5, services that should be used for Samatha R. cannot be used if she is
processed through the juvenile justice system, because they do not exist for sexually exploited
youth. Samatha R. is a victim of crime and should be treated as one. Consider the following
passage:
Appropriate services for sexually exploited youth do not exist in the juvenile justice
system and both federal and international law recognize that sexually exploited youth are
victims of crime and should be treated as such. (p. 1)
In regards to Research Question 6, the goals of the court are not to treat Samatha R. as a criminal
and prosecute her. Instead, the court wants to treat her as a victim and provide her with services.
Consider the following passage:
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“Therefore, sexually exploited youth should not be prosecuted under the Penal Law for
acts of Prostitution. Instead, services should be created to meet the needs of these youth
outside of the justice system” (p. 1).
As for Research Question 7, the needs of society represented by actions taken, are explained in
the following passages. First, the defendant is a sexually exploited youth and deserves help to get
back on her feet, as explicated in this argument:
Sexually exploited youth deserve the protection and services of the family court through
processes in place for persons in need of supervision, including diversion, crisis
intervention, counseling, and emergency and long-term housing services. (p. 1)
Second, the amount of damage caused by the defendant’s actions is small. To charge her with a
crime would do her more harm than any societal harm she may have caused. For instance,
consider the following explanation from the court:
Second, the extent of harm caused by the offense is likewise minimal. Although, I
recognize…that prostitution may negatively impact all participants as well as the
neighborhoods where it occurs, the harm of the violation her is minimal. More
importantly, I am persuaded that the harm to the defendant’s own physical and mental
welfare from the alleged conduct is greater than any societal harm that I can see in this
particular case. (p. 5)
Third, the courts do not believe dismissing the charges will create a problem for the safety or
welfare of the community, as expressed in this passage:
Sixth, I do not believe that dismissal will impact the safety or welfare of the community.
Although prostitution may have negative collateral effects on the community, attributing
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such effects to the alleged conduct of this particular defendant would surely be an
exaggeration. (p. 6)
For Research Question 8, the difference in the arrests made for domestic adolescent victims of
trafficking as opposed to foreign adolescent victims is explained in the following quote. This
quote explains that congress provided a form of relief for children who are under 18 and are
victims of a severe form of trafficking. The example given is prostitution through “T” and “U”
visas as conveyed in the following passage:
In 2000, Congress also provided avenues of immigration relief for children under 18 who
are victims of a severe form of trafficking, i.e., prostitution, through “T” and “U” visas
(see Slocum, Immigration Remedies for Victims of Human Trafficking, Lawyers Manual,
at 209, 215). (p. 2)
In the case of The People, Plaintiff and Respondent v. N.C. (2016), Research Questions 1
and 2 reveal the dimensions of attitudes or perceptions and factors underlying those particular
attitudes or perceptions involves not punishing the defendant. The court believes the defendant
should be rehabilitated and not left with a criminal record. Consider the following passage:
As delinquency judges and advocates, our responsibility is not to punish a person who
commits a crime. It is, rather to rehabilitate and protect those who are under the age of 18
from the consequences of their conduct and perhaps get them to a position where they
become law-abiding citizens in a way that does not leave them with an enduring or
lasting criminal record. (p. 1243-1244)
In regard to Research Question 3, the court decided that N.C. was a victim and did commit the
offenses as a result of being a victim of human trafficking, however they declined her request to

38
exclude evidence, because they feel that Evidence Code section 1161 does not apply. Consider
the following passage:
Although, without objection from the district attorney, the court found the appellant to
have committed the charged acts “as a result of being a victim of human trafficking,” it
nevertheless denied her motion to exclude evidence after concluding that, as matters of
law, Evidence Code section 1161 does not apply to cases such as this, in which the victim
of human trafficking did not actually engage in “sexual conduct on account of which
anything of value is given or received by any person” (Pen. Code, § 236, subd. (h)(2).).
(p. 1242)
As for Research Question 4, the defendant felt she needed to exclude all evidence that was to be
provided by the district attorney. Consider the following passage:
At the commencement of the jurisdictional hearing, appellant moved under section 1161
to exclude all evidence sought to be introduced by the district attorney to show that she
solicited acts of prostitution in violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b). (p.
1239)
For Research Question 5, the services that were not used include Social Services. Social Services
refused to accept N.C. as a client because her family lived in Northern California. Consider the
following passage:
On June 24, after the Los Angeles County Department of Social Services declined to
accept the appellant as a client because her family resided in Northern California, the
court ordered the matter transferred to Contra Costa County for disposition 9. (p. 1243)
For Research Question 6, the goal, purpose, or concern of the court is not to punish the
defendant, but to rehabilitate her. Consider the following passage:
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As delinquency judges and advocates our responsibility is not to punish a person who
commits a crime. It is, rather to rehabilitate and protect those who are under the age of 18
from the consequences of their conduct and perhaps get them to a position where they
become law-abiding citizens in a way that does not leave them with an enduring or
lasting criminal record. (p. 1243-1244)
As for Research Question 7, the court decides in the interest of society that the defendant needs
to have a form of adult supervision, so she doesn’t fall back into a dangerous situation as
depicted in the following passage:
I think it is great that [appellant’s] grandparents are willing to take care of her in these
uncertain and difficult times, but as a judge who has observed [appellant’s] history, my
biggest concern, and it’s a concern in all these sorts of cases, is that without court
supervision, without becoming either a 300 or 602 ward, there is no incentive for her to
follow through. She has not reached the maturity level that would satisfy any reasonable
judge in believing that she might not run. Believing appellant lacks “real adult
supervision,” the court stated that the bottom line is, without some kind of jurisdiction
over the minor, this minor is in serious danger of, well, falling by the wayside, whether
she runs away, whether she re-engages with one of the pimps that have been testified
about. There is no way for a juvenile judge to protect a minor like this without a
declaration of wardship, without gaining jurisdiction over the minor. (p. 1244)
No data was ascertained for Research Question 8.
In the case of The People, Plaintiff and Respondent v. M.D. (2014), Research Questions 1
and 2 reveal the dimensions of attitudes or perceptions held and the factors underlying those
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attitudes or perceptions, involve the court believing there is insufficient proof that M.D. was a
victim of human trafficking at the time of her arrest as expressed in the following passage:
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found there was insufficient evidence that the
minor was a victim of human trafficking under the definition set forth in Penal Code
section 236.1 and denied the minor’s motion. (p. 998)
For Research Question 3, the court makes the decision that it is M.D.’s responsibility to provide
the burden of proof that she was a victim of human trafficking. Thus, the court opined the
following:
We disagree. The facts necessary to establish that the minor was a victim of human
trafficking are in fact “peculiarly” within her personal knowledge. She has the most
knowledge as to the circumstances that led her to engage in prostitution, who – if anyone
– induced or persuaded her to do so, and to whom – if anyone – she is reporting or
delivering the proceeds of her prostitution activity. (See, e.g., People v. Mower (2002) 28
Cal.4th 457, 477 [122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]. (p. 1000)
For Research Question 4, the defendant feels the court is wrong in requiring her to present the
burden of proof that she was a victim of human trafficking. Thus, the defendant opined the
following:
The minor contends the court erred by placing the burden of proof on her to establish she
was a victim of human trafficking and, alternatively, that even if the burden was hers, the
evidence she presented was sufficient to meet her burden. (p. 999)
No data was ascertained for Research Question 5. As for Research Question 6, the goal of the
court is to show that for the defendant to be found a victim it is necessary for her to show that the
alleged human trafficker forced her to engage in prostitution. The court ruled that:
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Thus, for the minor to be found to be a victim of human trafficking, it was necessary for
her to prove that Antonio, the alleged human trafficker, persuaded or attempted to
persuade her to engage in prostitution with the intent “to effect or maintain” a violation of
Penal Code section 266i. (p. 1003)
For Research Question 7, the needs of society depicted by the court are that they protect the
people of their state, particularly the children from sexual exploitation as conveyed in the
following argument:
The people of the state of California find and declare: 1. Protecting every person in our
state, particularly our children, from all forms of sexual exploitation is of paramount
importance. (p. 998)
No data was ascertained for Research Question 8.
In the case of The People, Plaintiff and Respondent v. Aarica S. (2014), Research
Questions 1 and 2 reveal the dimensions of attitudes or perceptions that are held and the factors
that underlie those attitudes or perceptions, involve the court not believing that the defendant was
a victim of human trafficking at the time of her arrest. The court opined that:
She wasn’t working for anybody or paying anybody any money. I don’t think that based
upon that she was a victim of sexual trafficking. And when the incident occurred on the
31st of January, that she was acting independently on her own with no solicitation or
encouragement by anyone else to get her to do it. I don’t think it has any connection. You
would have a much stronger case at the time she was doing it [if] she was still under the
power and under the control of one of these pimps, but she was not. And it appeared that
it was several months before that she wasn’t. (p. 1485)
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For Research Question 3, the court decided to deny the defendant’s request to exclude evidence
that related to her soliciting sex. Consider the following passage:
The court denied the appellant’s motion to exclude evidence relating to her having
solicited a commercial sex act with Officer Morales. The court reasoned that, when
appellant approached Officer Morales, “she was acting as an independent contractor,
nobody threatening her or threatening to kill her if she doesn’t make money. (p. 1485)
For Research Question 4, the defendant expresses the need to make a quick buck. She explains
why she approached the man she later found out was a cop. She also admits she did not have a
pimp at the time of her arrest as conveyed in the following passage:
When asked why she decided to approach Officer Morales, she explained that she saw
him circling the neighborhood. She explained that she was thinking, ‘Don’t go to the car;
don’t do it. You are better than that. But he just kept coming by, so I just decided that I
could do whatever he wanted really quick and then have money in my pocket, because I
didn’t have any money.’ She agreed that no one forced her to get into the car and that she
did not have a pimp, so she would get to keep all the money she made. She had not had a
pimp since November 2012. (p. 1485)
No data was ascertained for Research Question 5, 6, 7 and 8. Table 1 presents the number of
instances per court decision where plain meaning results could be identified for any of the eight
guiding research questions for the Level I textual analysis. All six court decisions yielded data
for the first four research questions, while only five cases produced results for Research Question
5, only four cases produced data for Research Question 6, three cases found results for Research
Question 7, and a single case produced findings for Research Question 8.
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Table 1. Level I Summary Table of Plain Meaning Results for Each Question
Questions People v.

People v.

People v.

In re.

In re.

In re.

G.M

Samatha

L.G.

Aarica S.

N.C.

M.D.

{NY}

R. {NY}

{NY}

{CA}

{CA}

{CA}

(2011)

(2011)

(2013)

(2014)

(2016)

(2014)

Total

1

6

2

6

3

6

4

6

5

4

6

5

7

3

8

1

Total

6

8

6

4

7

6

Level II Analysis
There are four common themes found among the six court cases: relief, best interest,
rehabilitation, and individual accountability. For each of the themes, a quote has been chosen
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from one of the six court cases, that best represents it. The quote will be followed by an
explanation of what the quote is saying.
The first theme is “relief.” “Relief” is defined as meaning alleviation, ease, or deliverance
though removal of pain, distress, oppression, anxiety, or redress of a hardship. Relief also
extends the connotation of providing "support," "reinforcement," and "legal backing," which is
why the similar concept of "protection" that often appeared in passages as evidence of the theme
of relief, was also included as a term synonymous with the larger notion of relief. Moreover, the
concept of relief also includes connotations closely related to the concept of "mercy" and the
usage of both terms seeks to grant "mitigation," "amelioration," "reprieve," and "forgiveness."
The following quote was chosen from the case of The People of the State of New York v. L.G.
(2013) to illustrate the concept of relief: “Trafficked persons should not suffer ongoing
punishment for acts they committed unwillingly under coercion (Id)” (p. 438).
This quote is saying that the individual who was trafficked should not have to endure further
discomfort and agony for acts they were forced to do. They should be granted relief.
The second theme is “best interest.” Best interest is defined as meaning to the advantage,
benefit, or advancement of someone, especially in the context of providing the best interest of
the child with the ultimate goal of fostering and encouraging the child's happiness, security,
mental health, and emotional development into young adulthood. The following quote was
chosen from The People of the State of New York v. Samatha R. (2011) to convey the message of
the theme:
Nor can I ignore that her continued prosecution in a criminal court may traumatize her to
a greater extent than the prosecution of an adult defendant would affect an adult. These
concerns counsel against continuing a prosecution, no matter how sensitively handled by
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the District Attorney, of an individual whom the law alternatively regards a child and an
adult or quasi-adult (see n. 3 supara), and whom the law also calls an “exploited child”
and possibly a “victim,” particularly where another appropriate forum may address the
circumstances of her alleged offense 4. (p. 5)
This quote is saying that the judge believes the defendant’s time spent in court defending her
case may do her more harm than it would an adult defendant and that would be a concern no
matter how delicately the District Attorney handled the case. Furthermore, the judge believes this
case should be taken to another forum besides a criminal court. The judge is looking out for
Samatha R.’s best interest.
The third theme is “rehabilitation.” Rehabilitation is defined as meaning, to restore
someone to a condition of good health, normal life, and former reputation after falling into
disfavor for wayward actions and behaviors. The following quote was chosen from The People,
Plaintiff and Respondent v. N.C. (2016) to explicate this theme:
As delinquency judges and advocates, our responsibility is not to punish a person who
commits a crime. It is, rather to rehabilitate and protect those who are under the age of 18
from the consequences of their conduct and perhaps get them to a position where they
become law-abiding citizens in a way that does not leave them with an enduring or
lasting criminal record (p. 1243-1244)
This quote is saying that the court believes N.C. should be rehabilitated rather than be punished
further or have her future permanently tainted by a criminal record. The court thinks she should
be protected from the repercussions of her choices since she was under the age of 18 at the time
of her arrest, and that punishment will not restore her to a better state. Thus, rehabilitation is
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merited for the restoration of her tarnished character. Furthermore, N.C. should have the
opportunity to make something of her life and become a contributing member of society.
The fourth and last theme is “individual accountability.” Individual accountability is
defined as meaning the state of being accountable, liable, or answerable, which also captures the
concept of “free agency.” Free agency suggests that a person is self-determining and acting of
their own volition. The following quote was chosen from The People, Plaintiff and Respondent
v. Aarica S. (2014) to provide meaning for this theme:
She wasn’t working for anybody or paying anybody any money. I don’t think that based
upon that she was a victim of sexual trafficking. And when the incident occurred on the
31st of January, that she was acting independently on her own with no solicitation or
encouragement by anyone else to get her to do it. I don’t think it has any connection. You
would have a much stronger case at the time she was doing it [if] she was still under the
power and control of one of these pimps, but she was not. And it appeared that it was
several months before that she wasn’t. (p. 1485)
This quote is saying that the court believes Aarica S. was choosing to prostitute herself without
any coercion from a pimp at the time of her arrest. She didn’t have to answer to anyone except
herself. While she may have been a victim of human trafficking in the past, at the time of her
arrest she was acting of her own volition. She was accountable, only to herself. A procedural
concept related to “insufficient evidence” also emerged among the cases examined suggesting
some defendants did not deserve relief because they provided inadequate proof of their
victimization. After reviewing the context of how "insufficient evidence" was employed, it was
concluded that the court was still predominantly preoccupied with the notion of "individual
accountability" in that the court was placing the "burden of proof" and any attempt at providing a
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defense solely on the defendant's ability to do so. Therefore, the court was holding the youth to
account for any inability to prove a defense with adequate evidence; thus, placing the fault on the
individual defendant.
Table 2 presents the thematic data to highlight visually where themes emerged within
court cases and across court cases. Each court case had at least one emergent theme and three
court cases had more than one theme emerge. The theme of “relief” was most common and
utilized across four court decisions (i.e., three New York rulings and one California ruling).
“Rehabilitation” appeared in three court rulings (i.e., two New York rulings and one California
ruling), while individual accountability appeared in two decisions (i.e., both California rulings),
and best interest only surfaced in one New York ruling.
Table 2. Level II Summary Table of Commonly Found Themes
Themes

People v. People v.

People v. In re.

G.M.
{NY}
(2011)

L.G.
{NY}

Samatha
R. {NY}

(2013)

In re.

Aarica S. N.C.
{CA}
{CA}
(2014)
(2016)

In re.

Total

M.D.
{CA}
(2014)

(2011)
Relief

4

Best
Interest

1

Rehabilitation

3

Individual
Accountability

2

Total

2

3

1

1

2

1
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Chapter Five: Discussion
Research Questions 1 and 2 sought to unearth the dimension of attitudes or perceptions
held by courts and the factors underlying those particular attitudes when juvenile girls who were
arrested for prostitution claimed to be trafficking victims. The plain meaning results from the
Level I textual analysis revealed variation in the attitudes held across the six court cases;
however, for the majority of the cases, the courts maintained a desire to seek relief through
Safety Harbor Acts or rehabilitative alternatives for the girls in question, which would aim to
prevent further victimization of these youth. Only a couple of court decisions (i.e., In re Aarica
S. and In re M.D.) appeared to exhibit attitudes or perceptions of skepticism toward the
defendants’ claims of coercion, and in these instances, the courts focused on the youthful
defendants’ abilities to adequately prove they were indeed human trafficking victims.
Research Question 3 intended to examine the decisions or actions taken or not taken by
the courts in the cases being analyzed. In the majority of the cases, the courts decided not to take
punitive action against the girls who claimed to be trafficking victims. The courts reasoned that
the girls deviant behavior was a product of their coercion and to sanction punishment would do
more harm than good. As such, the courts frequently sought to grant relief and vacate charges
that would lead to punitive sanctions against the defendants. However, the In re Aarica S. (2014)
and In re M.D. (2014) court rulings decided differently than the other four cases and found that
the charges should not be vacated and defendants should not be allowed to exclude evidence
because the courts found their proof of being trafficking victims to be insufficient.
Research Question 4 assessed what particular needs surfaced from these cases. One
common need that emerged across four of the cases was the defendant’s need for safety from the
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threat of further harm and suffering at the hands of their traffickers. Another common need
expressed in the majority of the cases, was that further punitive action by the courts would only
serve as a detriment for the defendant’s recovery and desistance from crime. On the other hand,
the In re Aarica S. (2014) and In re M.D. (2014) court decisions acknowledged the need for these
youthful defendants to solely take on the burden of proof when it came to substantiating their
claims of victimization and coercion as human trafficking victims. The jurists in the Aarica S.
and M.D. rulings were less concerned with the defendants’ safety and security and more
concerned with holding them accountable for their delinquent acts.
Research Question 5 was concerned with whether particular services or programs were
used, or not used, in these cases. In the majority of the cases, rehabilitative (e.g., GEMS
program, counseling) and victim-based services (T- or U- Visa, crisis intervention, emergency
long-term housing) were employed to help the youthful defendants reclaim their lives and
recover from their victimization. Only two cases (i.e., In re Aarica S. and In re M.D) did not use
services or had no mention of providing services to the defendants.
Research Questions 6 and 7 evaluated the needs, rationales, justifications, and purpose
underpinning why the courts, in these cases, made certain decisions. Four of the court decisions
(i.e., People v. L.G., In re N.C., People v. G.M., and People v. Samantha R.) justified their
rationales for seeking to be more lenient on the defendants as being motivated by a desire to
rehabilitate, provide relief to, and protect these youth since they were victims of trafficking.
These four court rulings believed it was in society’s best interest to support these youth and get
them back on their feet to lead productive lives. In re Aarica S. and In re M.D appeared to be
mostly concerned with holding the youthful defendants accountable for their delinquent
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behaviors and to protect the larger goals of society from sexual deviance promoted by
prostitution.
Research Question 8 aimed to ascertain if the defendant’s status as native or foreign-born
entailed more leniency or harshness from the court based on the ruling outcomes. Only one case,
People v. Samantha R., addressed this issue of defendant nationality. It was found that foreignborn defendants were granted some measure of mercy for their victim status as trafficked youth
and were granted access to T- or U-Visas for safety and protection.
Interestingly, the thematic analysis found that the themes of rehabilitation, best interest,
and relief were most common among the three New York court decisions and only one of the
California rulings. Conversely, two of the California decisions were more punitive toward the
youthful defendants claiming to be victims of human trafficking, and the theme of individual
accountability for one’s action predominantly prevailed in those two cases.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
This thesis used a qualitative examination of the adjudication of underaged girls picked
up for prostitution, who claim to have been victims of human trafficking. The study involved six
court cases. Three were from New York (NY), and three were from California (CA). The first
level of analysis narrowed in on plain meaning, which was guided by a series of eight questions
that revealed information as to the court’s jurisprudential intent. The second level of analysis
focused on recurrent themes that revealed themselves throughout the six court cases.
Prior research on this subject found that in general many girls who were picked up for
prostitution who were victims or claimed to be victims of human trafficking were charged and
left with a record (Meiers, 2015). There were regional differences found between NY and CA.
California was overall more punitive than NY. Out of the three cases from California, only one
girl had her charges reversed (i.e., In re N.C.). The other two girls were left with records.
However, the two cases where the girls were left with charges on their records, the girls failed to
prove that they were victims of human trafficking at the time of their arrest. It is impossible to
know if things would have gone differently if the same girls had been tried in NY. It is clear that
the NY courts pushed for the common theme of relief when it came to girls whom had been
arrested that were victims of human trafficking, whereas the one common theme displayed by
CA was individual accountability. What is clear from the court cases is that the three cases tried
in NY each girl was given relief from her charges. NY also happens to be the front-runner for
Safe Harbor Law legislation as of 2008 (Baird, 2019), but whether that has any bearing on the
outcomes is unclear. In the cases from CA, two of the girls were not able to prove they were
victims at the time of their arrest.
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Implications for Policy and Practice
It is critical that a form of legislation is created, and used, nationwide that allows victims
of human trafficking to have their records expunged. While some states have legislation that
does this, not all states are on board as of yet: “Several states have enacted legislation intended to
relieve the victim of the burdens associated with her criminal record. In 2010, New York
Criminal Procedure Law Section 440.10 (i) became the first statute of its kind allowing a victim
of human trafficking to vacate certain convictions” (Meier, 2015, pp. 217-218). According to
Baird (2019), 34 states endorsed Safe Harbor laws for minors as of 2016. However, the states
each disagree as to what age the minor must be in order for the law to be administered. While
some states are making minors eligible for safe harbor laws when they are under the age of 16,
others must be under the age of 16. Furthermore, some states demand that more requirements be
met in order to receive relief (Baird, 2019). This is why it is important for all states to get on the
same page. Safe Harbor laws would be a great place to start, if more states, if not all of them,
adopted the legislation and could come to an agreement on the requirements. Baird (2019)
believes that “until society, future prosecutors, future defense attorneys, judges, and legislators
understand the victimology of sex trafficking, adequate laws will not be passed or applied
correctly” (p. 340).
The effect of a criminal record can be a great burden to the victim who is trying to reenter society. Acquiring housing, financial assistance, education, and employment with a
criminal record, that originates from being a victim of sex trafficking can be quite burdensome, if
it is even possible to achieve. Furthermore, being granted custody of a child is also an uphill
climb for those with a criminal record. A form of legal relief that grants expungement is
impetrative, in order to clear the constraints placed by a victim’s criminal record (Meiers, 2015).
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In order for more states to realize the importance of enacting legislation for victims of
human trafficking, if not getting on the safe harbor law band wagon, more education is
necessary. The public is in dire need of education and elaboration on the ramifications of
trafficking and prostitution and how minors come to be entrapped in and stay involved in the
commercial sex industry (Baird, 2019). Prospective practitioners of law and criminal law
enforcement agencies need to be taught how to identify sex trafficking victims, as well as how to
guarantee that no unlawful charge is brought against them. Furthermore, teach them how to help
victims gain access to laws that are fashioned to help them. Another venue where education is
important is law professors and their students. Helping their students by educating them about
human trafficking is imperative. Only once the fallacies of victims of human trafficking are
eradicated will things begin to change (Baird, 2019).
Thompson and Artiles (2016) provide an example of potential model for other juvenile
justice systems, presented by Texas in response to sex trafficking and prostitution. What Texas
has done is considerably reduced the level of prostitution related arrests and referrals to the
juvenile justice system. The researchers claim, “Texas has taken a step in the right direction of
not re-victimizing sexual abuse victims and decreasing the future prison population” (Thompson
& Artiles, 2016, p. 240). The pathway that Texas takes when approaching juveniles who are
implicated in human trafficking situations is an all-inclusive one. Their pathway focuses on the
relevance of decriminalizing sex-related offenses in the juvenile justice system, and accurately
identifying victims of sexual abuse as victims and not criminals. Of the bills Texas Legislature
created, one of the most crucial in the fight to keep minors who are victims of sexual abuse out
of prison, was Senate Bill 92 (S.B.92). This bill helped to decriminalize sexual abuse victims, as
well as, gave probation departments the ability to generate diversion programs, which provide
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services and treatments for minors who may be victims of sex trafficking (Thompson & Artiles,
2016). Another set of bills that Texas has created that human trafficking victims include; House
Bill 1272 (H.B. 1272) and House Bill 2725 (H.B. 2725). What H.B. 1272 did was, allowed the
2009 Human Trafficking Prevention Task Force to operate for another two years. The other bill
H.B. 2725, helps protect victims by giving human trafficking shelters, and agencies that place
children to be free of having to respond to particular public information requests. These would
include staff and victim’s personal contact information. Texas has significantly reduced the
number of arrests for minor girls and adult women by decriminalizing juvenile offenses and
looking for substitute methods to locking up victims of sexual abuse (Thompson & Artiles,
2016). Another step Texas has taken to improve the outcomes for victimized minors has been to
allow them access to treatment, rehabilitative services, counseling, and access to necessities. In
order to give the minors access to rehabilitative services was to decriminalize sex-based offenses,
specifically prostitution, in situations where the act was committed by a minor. This was made
possible by training law enforcement, the juvenile justice department, family services, and any
other groups who were responsive, as to how to accurately identify triggers of trauma,
specifically sexual abuse (Thompson & Artiles, 2016). Texas’s example has shown that with the
right bills and training it is possible to help keep victims of sex trafficking and prostitution out of
the system, even in a state historically known for “get tough” approaches to crime and
delinquency.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
In regard to limitations, this study was limited to only six court decisions. Therefore,
comparisons can only be made among those six cases and the two states the cases were tried in,
New York and California. The deciding factor was ultimately if the underaged minor was able to
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prove that they were a victim of human trafficking at the time she was arrested. As mentioned
before, four of the six cases allowed the victim of human trafficking relief from their original
charges. Three of the cases were tried in New York and one was tried in California. The four
underaged females were allowed a chance at a productive future. Two of the cases, which
happened to have been tried in California did not allow their minors a clean slate. Neither of the
underaged girls were able to prove that they were victims of human trafficking at the time of
their arrest. The common themes that arose among cases tried in New York were relief, best
interest, and rehabilitation. The common themes in the one case where the minor tried in
California and was freed of her tainted record, were relief and rehabilitation, whereas the
common theme found in the California cases where the minors were left with a record was,
individual accountability.
Future research would be possible with more cases from more states. With a larger pool
of data, it would be feasible to compare how the cases were tried and discover what if any
common themes arise. Another possible angle at future research would be the potential
interviewing of victims of human trafficking. Using this data, another pool of common themes
could be generated and compared, from which conclusions could be made.
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Appendix C:
Quotations Selected for Level I Textual Analysis
Level I Analysis – Findings - #1 The People of the State of New York v. G. M. (2011)
Question 1:
“This defendant was convicted of four crimes and two violations, only two of the crimes are
covered by [this statute]. It is the People’s position that based on our reliance on the defendant’s
truthfulness, the right thing to do is to consent to the defendant’s motion. Again, the People are
stressing that we are not looking to expand on the statute, this is not a case to refer to in future
440 motions. This case in no way sets a precedent for how the People will view other cases, nor
the People expect this decision to effect the defendant’s cases in any other county. Having said
all of that your Honor, the People do consent to defense’s 440.10 motion” (p. 278).

“Moreover, the defendant has provided a very compelling narrative of the circumstances
surrounding all of her arrests, demonstrating that they were the product of years of brutal
physical, psychological and sexual violence by her husband, which resulted in having been
trafficked by him” (p. 280).

“While the defendant has moved to vacate all six convictions based on the provisions of the new
amendment, and even though only two are prostitution offenses technically covered by the scope
of **766 CPL 440.10[1][i]), this issue need not be addressed in the instant case because the
People have consented to the defendant’s motion in its entirety. 7” (p. 280).
Question 2:
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“Your Honor, you know the People have spent a great deal of time reviewing all of the facts of
this case. While every 440.10 motion is viewed on its own merit, this case was an exceptional
case and the merits of the case were based totally on the People’s reliance on the defendant’s
truthfulness of what she disclosed in the affidavit on May 13th as well as her interview on
November 22nd. […] The People are exercising discretion in this particular case, the People are
not looking to expand the statute” (p. 278).

“This defendant was convicted of four crimes and two violations, only two of the crimes are
covered by [this statute]. It is the People’s position that based on our reliance on the defendant’s
truthfulness, the right thing to do is to consent to the defendant’s motion. … Having said all of
that your Honor, the People do consent to defense’s 440.10 motion” (p. 278)

“With respect to the case at bar, a federal agency has already recognized the defendant as a
victim of human trafficking. While “official documentation of the defendant’s status” from a
federal agency is not required for granting a motion to vacate under CPL 440.10(1)(i), it
nevertheless “create(s) a presumption that the defendant’s participation in the offense was the
result of having been a victim of sex trafficking or trafficking in persons” (440.10[1][i][ii])” (p.
280).

“Moreover, the defendant has provided a very compelling narrative of the circumstances
surrounding all of her arrests, demonstrating that they were the product of years of brutal
physical, psychological and sexual violence by her husband, which resulted in having been
trafficked by him” (p. 280)
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“Based upon the unique circumstances presented here, this court concurs with the People’s
position that all of the defendant’s convictions are entitled to the relief requested. Thus, under the
provisions of the new amendment, this court “must vacate the judgement and dismiss the
accusatory instrument[.]” (CPL 440.10[6].)” (p. 280-281).

Question 3:
“This defendant was convicted of four crimes and two violations, only two of the crimes are
covered by [this statute]. It is the People’s position that based on our reliance on the defendant’s
truthfulness, the right thing to do is to consent to the defendant’s motion. Again, the People are
stressing that we are not looking to expand on the statute, this is not a case to refer to in future
440 motions. This case in no way sets a precedent for how the People will view other cases, nor
the People expect this decision to effect the defendant’s cases in any other county. Having said
all of that your Honor, the People do consent to defense’s 440.10 motion” (p. 278)

“Moreover, the defendant has provided a very compelling narrative of the circumstances
surrounding all of her arrests, demonstrating that they were the product of years of brutal
physical, psychological and sexual violence by her husband, which resulted in having been
trafficked by him” (p. 280)

“While the defendant has moved to vacate all six convictions based on the provisions of the new
amendment, and even though only two are prostitution offenses technically covered by the scope
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of **766 CPL 440.10[1][i]), this issue need not be addressed in the instant case because the
People have consented to the defendant’s motion in its entirety. 7” (p. 280).

“Based upon the unique circumstances presented here, this court concurs with the People’s
position that all of the defendant’s *281 convictions are entitled to the relief requested. Thus,
under the provisions of the new amendment, this court “must vacate the judgement and dismiss
the accusatory instrument[.]” (CPL 440.10[6].)” (p. 280-281).

Question 4:
“In early 1996, D.S. went to the Dominican Republic and begged the defendant to move back
with him to New York, promising to find her a good job and to help her with her immigration
status. She decided to do so “in the hope that it would improve my life and the lives of my
children” (Affidavit of G.M. at 2). Upon her return to New York, the defendant discovered that
her husband was addicted to crack cocaine. The abuse resumed, and was often more severe when
he was under the influence of drugs” (p. 275)

“The continued violence at times resulted in visits to the hospital and left the defendant scarred
and disfigured. D.S. also raped her when he was high on crack cocaine and imprisoned *276 her
against her will, sometimes for an entire weekend. He succeeded in completely isolating her
from others and exerted control over almost every aspect of her life, taking all the income she
earned working at various jobs. He exercised complete control over her, physically and
psychologically, such that her “every move was tracked by [D.S]” and she was not “allowed” to
leave the room or apartment without him (id. at 3). He would often drop her off and pick her up
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from her jobs, waiting in a car parked outside to make sure she did not go somewhere else.” (p.
275-276).

“According to the defendant’s affidavit, D.S forced her to engage in these illegal activities,
including prostitution, upon threat of physical harm or actual violence if she did not comply. …If
she refused to comply with any of his demands, he would threaten to kill her or harm her
children in the Dominican Republic.” (id. at 9) “ (p. 276).

“In 2003, the defendant tried unsuccessfully to leave her abusive husband. That year, she
escaped from him and returned to the Dominican Republic to be with her children, whom she
had not seen in over eight years. He ultimately tracked her down and forced her to return by
issuing threats to harm a close family friend. When she returned to New York City, she found
that “nothing had changed. I just went back to the nightmare I was living. The beatings were
even worse because [D.S] was angry that I went to the Dominican Republic” (id.). The
defendant’s ordeal ended in January 2005, when D.S. left *277 one day and never returned. To
date, the defendant does not know where he is and he has not attempted to contact her. The
defendant eventually sought assistance from outside organizations to help her put her life back
together, and in 2009, she received a “T Visa” (T- 1 Nonimmigrant Classification Status), after
proving to the federal government that she was a victim of human trafficking. 3” (p 276-277).
Question 5:
“The defendant eventually sought assistance from outside organizations to help her put her life
back together, and in 2009, she received a “T Visa” (T- 1 Nonimmigrant Classification Status),
after proving to the federal government that she was a victim of human trafficking. 3” (p 277).
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“With the assistance of the Sex Workers Project of the Urban Justice Center, she was approved
to work again after successfully contesting DOH’s decision” (p. 277).
Question 6:
“Specifically, this new legislation allows for vacatur of convictions where the underlying
charged was for prostitution (Penal Law [“PL”] § 230.00) or loitering for the purpose of
engaging in a prostitution offense (PL § 240.37) and the defendant’s arrest on that charge “was a
result of having been a victim of sex trafficking under section 230.34 of the penal law or
trafficking in persons under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (United States Code, title 22,
chapter 78)[.]” (CPL 440.10[1][i].) “ (p. 279).
“The passage of this new law was based upon a recognition that “[v]ictims of sex trafficking who
are forced in to prostitution are frequently arrested for prostitution-related offenses and are
saddled with the criminal record. They are blocked from **765 decent jobs and other prospects
for rebuilding their lives. Even after they escape from sex trafficking, the criminal record
victimizes them for life” (Sponsor’s Mem., 2010 N.Y. Assembly Bill A7670). Thus this
legislation “would give victims of human trafficking a desperately needed second chance they
[deserve]” (id).” (p. 279).

Level I Analysis – Findings - #2 The People of the State of New York v. Samatha R. (2011)
Question 1:
“At the defendant’s arraignment, I addressed sua sponte whether I should dismiss this
prosecution both as an exercise of my interests-of-justice power and in light of the recently
enacted Safe Harbour for Exploited Children Act (the “Safe Harbour Act”) (as added by L 2008,
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ch 569 [eff Apr. 1, 2010]), which I read to express the intent of the Legislature that 16- and 17year-olds who are charged with prostitution offenses should be referred to Family Court rather
than prosecuted criminally” (p. 1).

“The People requested an opportunity to address my proposed dismissal in writing, even though
I noted that the legislative sponsors of the Safe Harbour Act believed that the mere pendency of
criminal charges against these children was itself harmful” (p. 1).

“Now, on a record that includes a submission by the People, I conclude that this prosecution
should be dismissed in the interests of justice” (p. 2).

“The factors set forth in CPL 170.40 clearly demonstrate to me that the prosecution of this
defendant would constitute injustice” (p. 5).

“Third, I will assume that evidence of guilt is strong. Further, I am aware of no misconduct in the
investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant. To the contrary, the District Attorney is
prosecuting this case with a focus on rehabilitative, rather than punitive, concerns. But even so,
the absence of these factors does not dissuade me from my conclusion that dismissal is
appropriate” (p. 6).

Question 2:
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“Arresting, prosecuting and incarcerating victimized youth serves to re-traumatize them and to
increase their feelings of low self-esteem. This only makes the process of recovery more
difficult” (p. 1).

“My review of the factors relevant to such a dismissal is informed by recent legislative
enactments that reveal an understanding that the victim of a prostitution offense may be the
prostitute herself. In fact, if the prostitute or, as here, alleged would-be prostitute, is 16- or 17years-old, the Legislature defines her as a “sexually exploited child” who may obtain child
welfare services for sexually exploited children (see Social Services Law 447-a[1][b]; [d]; 447b)” (p. 2).
“More recently, the Criminal Procedure Law was amended to provide that a victim of sex
trafficking may seek vacatur of judgements of conviction for loitering (the charge here) and
prostitution (see CPL 440.10[i] [eff Aug.13, 2010])” (p 3).

“For example, a report prepared for the New York State Office of Children and Family Services
determined that, in this state, the overwhelming majority of children who were identified as
having been subjected to commercial sexual exploitation, including prostitution, had prior childwelfare involvement through child abuse and neglect investigations and/or foster care
placement” (p. 3).

“First, the seriousness and circumstances of the offense alleged here are as minimally serious as
can be. The charged offense, Penal Law 240.37, is a violation, which is not even a “crime” under
the Penal Law’s classification scheme (see Penal Law 10.00[3]; [4]). The circumstances of the
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offense are likewise minimally serious: the defendant is alleged to have engaged in the
proscribed conduct-loitering in the middle of the street-for a total of twenty minutes and to have
stopped two passers-by to engage them in “conversation” “ (p. 5).

“Third, I will assume that evidence of guilt is strong. Further, I am aware of no misconduct in
the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant. To the contrary, the District Attorney
is prosecuting this case with a focus on rehabilitative, rather than punitive, concerns. But even
so, the absence of these factors does not dissuade me from my conclusion that dismissal is
appropriate” (p. 6).

“Fifth, I find that there would be little purpose in imposing a sentence on defendant and that the
effect of any such sentence would do more harm than good” (p. 6).

Question 3:
“Arresting, prosecuting and incarcerating victimized youth serves to re-traumatize them and to
increase their feelings of low self-esteem. This only makes the process of recovery more
difficult” (p. 1).

“The Chief Judge’s questions are particularly relevant in the context of this case. The Safe
Harbour Act specifically addresses the conduct charged here and provides for its non-punitive,
non-criminal adjudication in Family Court. The other recently enacted state and federal laws
previously mentioned would strongly suggest that criminal prosecution of a 16- or 17-year-old
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for a prostitution offense is inappropriate, and that the right response of law enforcement would
be to bring the child before Family Court” (p. 4).

“Clearly the District Attorney, by offering the STAR program is not seeking to punish but to
help her. Nonetheless, no matter how truly laudable are the District Attorney’s efforts to provide
a treatment option to defendant and others like her, I cannot ignore the fact that the court retains
the power to sentence the defendant to up to fifteen days in jail if she would ultimately fail to
finish the STAR program and is then convicted of the charged offense, and that as a consequence
of any such conviction she would have potentially life-long criminal record, albeit for a
violation” (p. 5).

“Third, I will assume that evidence of guilt is strong. Further, I am aware of no misconduct in the
investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant. To the contrary, the District Attorney is
prosecuting this case with a focus on rehabilitative, rather than punitive, concerns. But even so,
the absence of these factors does not dissuade me from my conclusion that dismissal is
appropriate” (p. 6).

“Fifth, I find that there would be little purpose in imposing a sentence on defendant and that the
effect of any such sentence would do more harm than good” (p. 6).

“The sentencing options in Criminal Court are limited. The likely sentence in a case such as this
would not involve jail. Even if the sentence were a conditional discharge with required
attendance at a counseling program, I see no purpose in imposing such a sentence when the
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options available in Family Court, as suggested by the Chief Judge, are likely superior because
of the statutory mandate of considering the child’s “best interests”” (p. 6).

“On the other hand, the effect of a conviction in this case would be seriously and inappropriately
detrimental to the defendant. If convicted and sentenced, she would have a record, albeit for a
non-criminal offense.” (p. 6)

“In sum, defendant here may have a life-long record of conviction of a stigmatizing offense
(unless it were subsequently vacated pursuant to CPL 440.10[i] or some other provision of law),
5

when other adolescents whose cases were resolved in more unfavorable circumstances (i.e.,

conviction of a misdemeanor or felony) or adults similarly situated (i.e., convicted of a violation
other than Penal Law 240.37) would not suffer the same detriment” (p. 6).

Question 4:
“Arresting, prosecuting and incarcerating victimized youth serves to re-traumatize them and to
increase their feelings of low self-esteem. This only makes the process of recovery more
difficult” (p. 1).

“Appropriate services for sexually exploited youth do not exist in the juvenile justice system and
both federal and international law recognize that sexually exploited youth are victims of crime
and should be treated as such” (p. 1).
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“Sexually exploited youth deserve the protection and services of the family court through
processes in place for persons in need of supervision, including diversion, crisis intervention,
counseling, and emergency and long term housing services” (p. 1).

“Many of these children have been the victims of sexual and other physical abuse; many suffer
from learning disabilities and limitations; many engage in what has been called “survival sex.”
They are at risk for HIV infection, post-traumatic stress disorder and other forms of mental
illness and violence (id. at 3-5, 8, 25)” (p. 3).

“Do we really want these teenagers processed in an adult criminal justice system focused on
punishment and incarceration?... where rehabilitative options are limited…where they may be
jailed…where they may be victimized…and where they may be burdened with a criminal record
that bars them from future employment and educational opportunities” (p. 4)?

Question 5:
“Appropriate services for sexually exploited youth do not exist in the juvenile justice system and
both federal and international law recognize that sexually exploited youth are victims of crime
and should be treated as such” (p. 1).

“The Legislature passed the Safe Harbour Act, among other things to make the Family Court’s
services available to sexually exploited children up to the age of 18. It amended the definition of
a “person in need of supervision” (“PINS”), with regard to whom a Family Court proceeding
may be originated, to include a child under 18 charged with prostitution (see Family Ct Act
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712[a]) or loitering for the purpose of prostitution (see Family Ct Act 712[a]; Social Services
Law 447-a [1][d]) 1” (p. 2).

“As a Family Court judge has observed, the Safe Harbour Act “expresses a preference that
children who have been sexually exploited be spared criminal prosecution…in favor of receiving
rehabilitative services.” (Matter of Bobby P., 28 Misc. 3d 959, 969, 907 N. Y. S. 2d 540 [Fam Ct
Queens County 2010]; see also Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY,
Family Ct Act 732” (p. 2).

“Before enumerating these factors, I wish to observe that the District Attorney offered the
defendant the Saving Teens at Risk (“STAR”) program, which is part of his office’s own
initiative to address prostitution by offenders under the age of 22 with counseling rather than
incarceration. The program is free. If a defendant completes it, she will receive an Adjournment
in Contemplation of Dismissal. No plea is required in order for her to participate in this
program” (p. 5).

Question 6:
“Therefore, sexually exploited youth should not be prosecuted under the Penal Law for acts of
prostitution. Instead services should be created to meet the needs of these youth outside of the
justice system” (p. 1).

“As a Family Court judge has observed, the Safe Harbour Act “expresses a preference that
children who have been sexually exploited be spared criminal prosecution…in favor of receiving
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rehabilitative services.” (Matter of Bobby P., 28 Misc. 3d 959, 969, 907 N. Y. S. 2d 540 [Fam Ct
Queens County 2010]; see also Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY,
Family Ct Act 732” (p. 2).

“The intent is to immunize most children who have committed sexual offenses from criminal
prosecution..., substituting PINS adjudication and services.”])” (p. 2).

“Nor can I ignore that her continued prosecution in a criminal court may traumatize her to a
greater extent than the prosecution of an adult defendant would affect an adult. These concerns
counsel against continuing a prosecution, no matter how sensitively handled by the District
Attorney, of an individual whom the law alternatively regards a child and an adult or quasi-adult
(see n. 3 supra), and whom the law also calls an “exploited child” and possibly a “victim,”
particularly where another appropriate forum may address the circumstances of her alleged
offense 4” (p. 5).

“I further surmise that the District Attorney may find that maintaining a prosecution against the
alleged teen prostitute might give law enforcement a tool with which to fight trafficking. Yet I
doubt whether any public interest in this regard cannot equally be achieved if this case were
handled in Family rather than Criminal Court” (p. 6).

Question 7:
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“Sexually exploited youth deserve the protection and services of the family court through
processes in place for persons in need of supervision, including diversion, crisis intervention,
counseling, and emergency and long term housing services” (p. 1).

“Second, the extent of harm caused by the offense is likewise minimal. Although I recognize, as
Judge Richard Weinberg of Midtown Community Court reasoned when he denied a motion
similar to the present (see People v. Lewis, 2010NY03560, NYLJ, decided July 12, 2011, at *1
[Crim Ct, N.Y. County, Weinberg, J.]), that prostitution may negatively impact all participants as
well as the neighborhoods where it occurs, the harm of the violation here is minimal. More
importantly, I am persuaded that the harm to defendant’s own physical and mental welfare from
the alleged conduct is greater than any societal harm that I can see in this particular case” (p. 5).

“Sixth, I do not believe that dismissal will impact the safety or welfare of the community.
Although prostitution may have negative collateral effects on the community, attributing such
effects to the alleged conduct of this particular defendant would surely be an exaggeration” (p.
6).

“I further surmise that the District Attorney may find that maintaining a prosecution against the
alleged teen prostitute might give law enforcement a tool with which to fight trafficking. Yet I
doubt whether any public interest in this regard cannot equally be achieved if this case were
handled in Family rather than Criminal Court” (p. 6).
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“Seventh, I believe that the public’s confidence in the criminal just system will be enhanced by a
dismissal here. The criminal justice system is not always the best venue for addressing societal
problems. Here, the alleged offense-which is not a crime-involves someone who, according to
the Penal Law, is barely an adult, if even that (seen. 3 supra), and who, according to the Social
Services Law, is a “sexually exploited child”’ (p. 6).

“I believe that as a result of a dismissal there, the public will be confident that our laws are not
inflexible or unduly harsh and that they do not operate in isolation of a growing awareness that,
in the appropriate case, the lessened culpability of a 16-year-old vis-á-vis an adult , as well as the
recognition that she is exploited if not also victimized, may require that the allegations against
her be addressed outside criminal court” (p. 6).

Question 8:
“In 2000, Congress also provided avenues of immigration relief for children under 18 who are
victims of a severe form of trafficking, i.e., prostitution, through “T” and “U” visas (see Slocum,
Immigration Remedies for Victims of Human Trafficking, Lawyers Manual, at 209, 215)” (p. 2).

Level 1 Analysis Findings #3 - The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. L.G (2013)
Question 1:
“The People do not contest the factual allegations presented by defendant. Rather, they argue that
her second conviction for criminal possession of a weapon should not be vacated because it is
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not a prostitution related charge, and as a matter of public policy, CPL 440 should not grant
greater protection to human trafficking victims in weapons cases” (p. 429).

“They also assert that defendant failed to seek relief under CPL 440 with due diligence *430
because she filed her motion three years after she ceased to fear her trafficker in 2008, and a year
after CPL 440 was amended to 2010 to allow relief for human trafficking victims (see CPL
440.10[1][i])” (p. 430).

“This court finds that LG was clearly a victim of sex trafficking under both federal and New
York state standards. LG has demonstrated that she was clearly a victim of sex trafficking under
the relevant state sex trafficking statute because of her trafficker’s use of force and fear to
compel her participation in prostitution (PL §230.35[5])” (p. 436).

“Defendant also meets *437 the requirements under the federal TVPA as a victim of a “severe”
form of trafficking because she was induced into commercial sex while under 18 years of age 11
(22 USC § 7102[8][A]; People v. G.M., 32 Misc.3d 274, 280, 922 N.Y.S.2d 761 [Crim. Ct.,
Queens County 2011]; see also People v. Doe, 34 Misc.3d 237, 935 N.Y.S.2d 481 [Sup. Ct.,
Bronx County 2011])” (p. 437).

“More to the point, LG’s participation in the offenses which led to her convictions was the direct
result of her actions as a trafficking victim forced into street prostitution by her pimp/trafficker”
(p. 437).
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“The People do not contest either defendant’s status or the circumstances surrounding both of her
arrests; only that her second conviction should not be subject to vacatur under this statute” (p.
437).

“Thus, the only disputed issue in this case is whether defendant’s conviction for a nonprostitution offense which was the direct result of her having been forced into sex trafficking
may be vacated under CPL 440.10(1)(i)” (p. 437).

“For the reasons explained below, this court holds that LG’s conviction for possession of a
weapon in the fourth degree falls within the ambit of the vacatur statute because her participation
in that offense was undeniably connected to the coerced trafficking activity which led to **425
her arrest on prostitution related charges and should therefore be vacated” (p. 437).

“The New York legislature passed the new vacatur law, codified at CPL 440.10(1)(i), based
upon a recognition of the continuing harm done to trafficking victims who are burdened with
criminal convictions as a result of their victimization in *438 the commercial sex trade” (p. 438).

“This new legislation was thus intended to “give victims of human trafficking a desperately
needed second chance they deserve” (Sponsor’s Mem. In Support, Bill Jacket, L. 2010, ch. 332,
§§ 1-5 at 13 [N.Y. Assembly Bill A7670]; see People v. G.M., Misc.3d at 279, 922 N.Y.S.2d
761; People v. Doe, 34 Misc.3d at 237, 935 N.Y.S.2d 481 [new legislation designed to assist
minor trafficking victims])” (p. 438).
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“Central to the issue raised by the instant motion is determining what is meant by the term
“arresting charge” in CPL 440.10(1)(i), and whether eligibility for relief is confined only to
prostitution and loitering offenses” (p. 438).

“There is no dispute that she was clearly a minor victim at the time of her arrest, under coercive
control of her trafficker, and that she possessed a pocket knife to protect herself on the streets
where she was *440 forced to work under dangerous conditions because she had been raped and
kidnapped in the past” (p. 440).

“Her conviction for criminal weapons-possession was clearly the result of her having been
trafficked and therefore the arrest charge could be considered a prostitution-related offense” (p.
440).

“*442 Accordingly, in order for the court to exercise its discretion to consider vacatur of each of
defendant’s judgments of conviction, the court must examine the unique factual circumstances
pertaining to each conviction” (p. 442).

Question 2:
“The People do not contest the factual allegations presented by defendant. Rather, they argue that
her second conviction for criminal possession of a weapon should not be vacated because it is
not a prostitution related charge, and as a matter of public policy, CPL 440 should not grant
greater protection to human trafficking victims in weapons cases” (p. 429).
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“They also assert that defendant failed to seek relief under CPL 440 with due diligence *430
because she filed her motion three years after she ceased to fear her trafficker in 2008, and a year
after CPL 440 was amended to 2010 to allow relief for human trafficking victims (see CPL
440.10[1][i])” (p. 430).

“As noted earlier, the facts are undisputed in this case. At issue here is whether Criminal
Procedure Law 440.10(1)(i) empowers the court to dismiss non-prostitution convictions which
directly resulted from defendant’s victimization as a trafficked person or whether the statute’s
scope must be narrowly applied to vacate only convictions for prostitution related offenses” (p.
435).

“In 2010, New York became the first state in the country to pass a law which allows defendants
to vacate their prior convictions which resulted from their experiences as victims of human
trafficking (CPL 440.10[1][i]). 9” (p. 435).

“Thus, in order to obtain the requested relief, the movant must *436 establish that (1) she was a
trafficking victim at the time of her arrest, and (2) her conduct or “participation in the offense”
leading to her arrest resulted from her being trafficked” (p. 436).

“On the federal level, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act specifically mentioned in CPL
440.10(1)(i) defines “severe forms of trafficking in persons” to include sex trafficking either in
which the victim is induced to engage in a commercial sex act through force, fraud or coercion,
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or where the victim induced to engage in the commercial sex act has not attained the age of 18
(22 USC § 7102[8][A])” (p. 436).

“Severe forms of trafficking in persons also include “the recruitment, harboring, transportation,
provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or
coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or
slavery” (id. at § 7102[8][B])” (p. 436).

“This court finds that LG was clearly a victim of sex trafficking under both federal and New
York state standards. LG has demonstrated that she was clearly a victim of sex trafficking under
the relevant state sex trafficking statute because of her trafficker’s use of force and fear to
compel her participation in prostitution (PL §230.35[5])” (p. 436).
“Defendant also meets *437 the requirements under the federal TVPA as a victim of a “severe”
form of trafficking because she was induced into commercial sex while under 18 years of age 11
(22 USC § 7102[8][A]; People v. G.M., 32 Misc.3d 274, 280, 922 N.Y.S.2d 761 [Crim. Ct.,
Queens County 2011]; see also People v. Doe, 34 Misc.3d 237, 935 N.Y.S.2d 481 [Sup. Ct.,
Bronx County 2011])” (p. 437).

“More to the point, LG’s participation in the offenses which led to her convictions was the direct
result of her actions as a trafficking victim forced into street prostitution by her pimp/trafficker”
(p. 437).
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“The People do not contest either defendant’s status or the circumstances surrounding both of her
arrests; only that her second conviction should not be subject to vacatur under this statute” (p.
437).

“Thus, the only disputed issue in this case is whether defendant’s conviction for a nonprostitution offense which was the direct result of her having been forced into sex trafficking
may be vacated under CPL 440.10(1)(i)” (p. 437).

“For the reasons explained below, this court holds that LG’s conviction for possession of a
weapon in the fourth degree falls within the ambit of the vacatur statute because her participation
in that offense was undeniably connected to the coerced trafficking activity which led to **425
her arrest on prostitution related charges and should therefore be vacated” (p. 437).

“Victims of trafficking into commercial sex are frequently arrested for prostitution-related
offenses and are then saddled with the criminal record for life, long after they may be freed from
exploitation. This record may prevent them from obtaining gainful employment and impair their
ability to access or stay in public or private housing, advance their education, or participate in
other important aspects of life” (p. 438).

“Indeed, human trafficking victims are frequently arrested and charged for a variety of offenses
based on actions which the victims were unwillingly coerced into committing by their
traffickers.” (p. 438-439).
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“Similarly, the governor’s approval memorandum recognized that a defendant could be arrested
for prostitution but convicted of another offense, and seek vacatur of that conviction under the
statute (Governor’s Approval Mem., Bill Jacket, L. 2010, ch. 332 at 5-6 [N.Y. Assembly Bill
A7670]). Thus, the legislative history of CPL 440.10(1)(i) shows that the legislature anticipated
that a victim of human trafficking arrested on prostitution-related charges may ultimately plead
guilty to an alternate count” (p. 439).

“It necessarily follows that where, as here, one of the arresting charges was loitering for the
purpose of engaging in prostitution, and the defendant pleaded guilty to a related non-prostitution
crime, then that conviction must be regarded as having resulted from defendant’s having been a
victim of sex trafficking. Consequently, that charge may be vacated under CPL 440.10(1)(i)” (p.
439).

“There is no dispute that she was clearly a minor victim at the time of her arrest, under coercive
control of her trafficker, and that she possessed a pocket knife to protect herself on the streets
where she was *440 forced to work under dangerous conditions because she had been raped and
kidnapped in the past” (p. 440).

“Her conviction for criminal weapons-possession was clearly the result of her having been
trafficked and therefore the arrest charge could be considered a prostitution-related offense” (p.
440).
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“*442 Accordingly, in order for the court to exercise its discretion to consider vacatur of each of
defendant’s judgments of conviction, the court must examine the unique factual circumstances
pertaining to each conviction” (p. 442).

Question 3:
“The People do not contest the factual allegations presented by defendant. Rather, they argue that
her second conviction for criminal possession of a weapon should not be vacated because it is
not a prostitution related charge, and as a matter of public policy, CPL 440 should not grant
greater protection to human trafficking victims in weapons cases” (p. 429).

“They also assert that defendant failed to seek relief under CPL 440 with due diligence *430
because she filed her motion three years after she ceased to fear her trafficker in 2008, and a year
after CPL 440 was amended to 2010 to allow relief for human trafficking victims (see CPL
440.10[1][i])” (p. 430).

“The People do not contest defendant’s factual averments. Accordingly, the court accepts as true
the following facts set out in defendant’s moving papers:” (p. 430).

“Thus, in order to obtain the requested relief, the movant must *436 establish that (1) she was a
trafficking victim at the time of her arrest, and (2) her conduct or “participation in the offense”
leading to her arrest resulted from her being trafficked” (p. 436).
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“This court finds that LG was clearly a victim of sex trafficking under both federal and New
York state standards. LG has demonstrated that she was clearly a victim of sex trafficking under
the relevant state sex trafficking statute because of her trafficker’s use of force and fear to
compel her participation in prostitution (PL §230.35[5])” (p. 436).

“The People do not contest either defendant’s status or the circumstances surrounding both of her
arrests; only that her second conviction should not be subject to vacatur under this statute” (p.
437).

“Thus, the only disputed issue in this case is whether defendant’s conviction for a nonprostitution offense which was the direct result of her having been forced into sex trafficking
may be vacated under CPL 440.10(1)(i)” (p. 437).

“For the reasons explained below, this court holds that LG’s conviction for possession of a
weapon in the fourth degree falls within the ambit of the vacatur statute because her participation
in that offense was undeniably connected to the coerced trafficking activity which led to **425
her arrest on prostitution related charges and should therefore be vacated” (p. 437).

“Additionally, the court rejects the People’s argument that defendant failed to file this motion
with due diligence after she ceased to be a victim of sex trafficking, as required under CPL
440.10(1)(i). According to defendant’s uncontested factual averments, she escaped her trafficker
in 2204, but feared until 2008 that he would track her down and harm her” (p. 441).
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“Additionally, the court notes that based upon LG’s uncontroverted factual averments, she was
only 14 years at the time of her conviction for disorderly conduct. Because disorderly conduct is
an offense for which criminal responsibility is not imposed on a minor under 16 (PL § 30.00 [2]),
the conviction on that charge is a nullity and should be dismissed (PL § 30.00[1]; People v.
Lebron, 197 A.D.2d 416, 602 N.Y.S.2d 602 [2d Dept.], app. Denied, 82 N.Y.2d 898, 610
N.Y.S.2d 165, 632 N.E.2d 475 [1993]; People v. McFadden, 194 A.D.2d 566, 598 N.Y.S.2d 567
[2d Dept.], Iv denied, 82 N.Y.2d 722, 602 N.Y.S.2d 820, 622 N.E.2d 321 [1993])” (p. 442).

“Accordingly, the judgment convicting defendant of disorderly conduct was ordered vacated,
and the accusatory instrument dismissed by this court” (p. 442).

“On November 7, 2003 defendant was arraigned under Docket number 2003QN050066 and
charged with loitering for the purpose of engaging in a prostitution offense (PL § 240.37[3]),
criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (PL § 265.01[1]) and disorderly conduct
(PL § 240/20[5]). Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth
degree and received a sentence of three years’ probation. It is apparent both from the defendant’s
factual averments, and the factual allegations contained in the complaint filed in the case, that the
knife at issue which gave rise to the weapons possession charge, was recovered incident to
defendant’s prostitution-related activity, and that she was a victim of trafficking at the time of
her arrest. Accordingly, the judgment convicting defendant of criminal possession of a *443
weapon in the fourth degree was ordered vacated and the accusatory instrument dismissed by this
court” (p. 442-443).
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“Based upon the foregoing, this court vacated the judgments of conviction entered under Docket
number 2000QN056893 and Docket number 2003QN050066 pursuant to CPL 440.10(1)(i) and
dismissed the accusatory instruments in each of these cases by Order dated January 2, 2013. The
court further ordered that the records of the defendant’s convictions be sealed under CPL
160.50(1), (3)(f)” (p. 443).

Question 4:
“Defendant asserts that her prior convictions are directly related to her arrests for prostitution
offenses, and that because she is a victim of human trafficking, those convictions must be
vacated and the cases dismissed. Defendant also argues that she was denied effective assistance
of counsel when she pleaded guilty in each case” (p. 429).

“When LG was about thirteen years old, she started working for “C.” She was required to give
him the money she made in exchange for her own room. She did not **421 enjoy her life being
prostituted: “[i]t wasn’t like I wanted to be out there, but being in foster care, going from home
to home, I felt like nobody cared about me. It made me feel so miserable.”” (p. 431).
“”Johns” 7 had raped, assaulted and threatened LG with weapons many times while she was
forced to work at a prostitute. Defendant explained that “[a]t the time of my second arrest, I had
heard that there was a guy out there who pretended to be a client, but would then rape girls and
beat them up. It felt like every time I turned around, some girl was missing. Another girl I knew
was raped and beaten up by a trick. She ended up in the hospital. I had already been raped by
clients and was terrified of it happening again. Every time I went out I was scared of being raped
or killed” (p. 433).
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“In 2004, LG was 18 years old when she was finally able to leave “the life.” Her pimp “E,” had
been arrested, which gave her the chance to escape. She returned to a foster care placement
agency, and for the first time in her life, disclosed what had happened to her as a child. They
place her with a family on Staten Island to keep her away from Brooklyn, where she did not feel
safe because she had been informed that her pimp was looking for her. She went back to school
and stayed with her foster family in Staten Island for a year before she was able to get a
subsidized apartment right before her 21st birthday” (p. 433).

“She received a home health aide degree in February 2007 and was working in that capacity
during most of 2007, until the New York City Department of Health ran a background check and
informed her that she could no longer work because of her past conviction. She received a GED
in 2010 and subsequently qualified for a certificate as a medical assistant. More recently, LG was
questioned about her ability to be a fit guardian when she petitioned for custody of her nephew –
because of her convictions” (p. 434).

“Defendant is currently a student at Medgar Evers College, and expects to graduate in 2014 with
a bachelors degree in public administration and social work. She avers that she wants “to vacate
my convictions so that I can move forward with my life and career without being held back by
my past”” (p. 434).
“LG argues that while her second conviction for weapons possession is admittedly not a
prostitution offense, it should nevertheless be dismissed because it resulted from her forced
involvement in trafficking activity by her pimp when he required her to engage in street
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prostitution. To support the connection between the weapons conviction and defendant’s coerced
prostitution activities, defense counsel notes that LG possessed a pocketknife to protect herself
against unpredictable and potentially violent situations involving “johns,” and was told to do so
by her trafficker” (p. 437).

Question 5:
“While living with her grandmother, LG was sexually abused by an uncle, but she never received
any medical attention even though ACS was involved and informed about the abuse” (p. 430).

“Following her grandmother’s death, LG was placed into foster care and over the next few years,
she was bounced around different foster homes until she was 12 years-old, when something
happened that changed her life” (p. 430).

“When LG was about thirteen years old, she started working for “C.” She was required to give
him the money she made in exchange for her own room. She did not **421 enjoy her life being
prostituted: “[i]t wasn’t like I wanted to be out there, but being in foster care, going from home
to home, I felt like nobody cared about me. It made me feel so miserable.”” (p. 431).

“*432 After about six months, LG met another pimp called “D” who took her to Atlantic City,
New Jersey. In 2000, “D” sent her by bus to Washington D.C., and then to Miami, Florida. In
Florida, defendant, who was 14 years old at the time, attempted to leave “the life” 6 by calling
her brother’s father who lived in Ft. Lauderdale. He came to get her, and she lived with him and
her brother for about two weeks. A friend bought her a ticket back to New York, where she
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resumed foster care placement. However, the family she was placed with did not support her” (p.
432).

“In 2004, LG was 18 years old when she was finally able to leave “the life.” Her pimp “E,” had
been arrested, which gave her the chance to escape. She returned to a foster care placement
agency, and for the first time in her life, disclosed what had happened to her as a child. They
place her with a family on Staten Island to keep her away from Brooklyn, where she did not feel
safe because she had been informed that her pimp was looking for her. She went back to school
and stayed with her foster family in Staten Island for a year before she was able to get a
subsidized apartment right before her 21st birthday” (p. 433).

“*434 LG had been previously mandated by the family court to participate in GEMS program 8
back in 2001 when she was 14 years old. As a result, she received support and counseling from
them. After leaving prostitution in 2004 she reconnected with GEMS and became an active
member, participating in their educational initiative program and in various therapy groups
before starting school again” (p. 434).

Question 6:
“The People do not contest the factual allegations presented by defendant. Rather, they argue that
her second conviction for criminal possession of a weapon should not be vacated because it is
not a prostitution related charge, and as a matter of public policy, CPL 440 should not grant
greater protection to human trafficking victims in weapons cases” (p. 429).
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“Thus, the only disputed issue in this case is whether defendant’s conviction for a nonprostitution offense which was the direct result of her having been forced into sex trafficking
may be vacated under CPL 440.10(1)(i)” (p. 437).

“The New York legislature passed the new vacatur law, codified at CPL 440.10(1)(i), based
upon a recognition of the continuing harm done to trafficking victims who are burdened with
criminal convictions as a result of their victimization in *438 the commercial sex trade” (p. 438).

“Victims of trafficking into commercial sex are frequently arrested for prostitution-related
offenses and are then saddled with the criminal record for life, long after they may be freed from
exploitation. This record may prevent them from obtaining gainful employment and impair their
ability to access or stay in public or private housing, advance their education, or participate in
other important aspects of life” (p. 438).

“Trafficked persons should not suffer ongoing punishment for acts they committed unwillingly
under coercion (Id)” (p. 438).

“Rather, this new law is premised upon the profound understanding that “trafficked persons
should not suffer ongoing punishment for acts they committed unwillingly under coercion [of a
trafficker]” (Sponsor’s Letter in Support, July 20, 2010 at 10, Bill Jacket, L. 2010, ch. 332, §§ 15), in which they are “presumably not criminally liable for the offense” (Peter Preiser, Supp
Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 11A, CPL 440.10, 2013 Pocket
Part at 99” (p. 439).
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Level 1 Analysis Findings # 4 – The People, Plaintiff and Respondent v. Aarica S. (2014)

Question 1:
“We hold that Evidence Code section 1161, subdivision (a), applies only when there is specific
casual connection between the person’s status as a victim of human trafficking and the
commission of the commercial sex act at issue. Because, supported by substantial evidence, the
juvenile court found that the appellant was not a victim of human trafficking in relation to the
solicitation of prostitution at issue here, we conclude that the Evidence Code section 1161 does
not apply, and affirm the juvenile court’s order” (p. 1482).

“She wasn’t working for anybody or paying anybody any money. I don’t think based upon that
she was a victim of sexual trafficking. And when the incident occurred on the 31st of January,
that she was acting independently on her own with no solicitation or encouragement by anyone
else to get her to do it. I don’t think it has any connection. You would have a much stronger case
at the time she was doing it [if] she was still under the power and under the control of one of
these pimps, but she was not. And it appeared that it was several months before that she wasn’t”
(p. 1485).

“Here the juvenile court found that when appellant solicited prostitution, she was acting as “an
independent contractor” because she was not working for a pimp or giving a pimp the money she
earned at the time. This finding is supported by the evidence and dispenses with application of
Evidence Code section 1161” (p. 1488).
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“The evidence thus supports the conclusion that the appellant did not solicit prostitution in this
instance “as a result of being a victim of human trafficking.” (Evid.Code, § 1161, subd. (a),
italics added.) The juvenile court accordingly did not err in denying the appellant’s motion to
exclude evidence pursuant to the statute” (p. 1488).

Question 2:
“She wasn’t working for anybody or paying anybody any money. I don’t think based upon that
she was a victim of sexual trafficking. And when the incident occurred on the 31st of January,
that she was acting independently on her own with no solicitation or encouragement by anyone
else to **140 get her to do it. I don’t think it has any connection. You would have a much
stronger case at the time she was doing it [if] she was still under the power and under the control
of one of these pimps, but she was not. And it appeared that it was several months before that she
wasn’t” (p. 1485).
“Evidence Code 1161, subdivision (a), applies only to “[e]vidence that a victim of human
trafficking, as defined in [Penal Code section 236.1], has engaged in any commercial sexual act
as a result of being a victim of human trafficking.” (Evid.Code, § 1161, subd. (a), italics added.)
The italicized language – “as a result of” – clearly requires a specific causal connection between
the victim’s status as a victim and the commercial sex act at issue” (p. 1487).

“Unless the evidence relates to a commercial sex act that the victim committed “as a result of
being a victim of human trafficking,” Evidence Code section 1161 does not apply” (p. 1487).
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“Thus, when Evidence Code section 1161 refers to commercial sex acts committed “as a result of
being a victim of human trafficking,” it contemplates the act or acts that makes the victim a
victim of human trafficking in the first place – act or acts the victim has been “cause[d],
induce[d], or persuade[d] … to engage in” (Pen.Code, § 236.1, subd. (c))” (p. 1487).

“Here the juvenile court found that when appellant solicited prostitution, she was acting as “an
independent contractor” because she was not working for a pimp or giving a pimp the money she
earned at the time. This finding is supported by the evidence and dispenses with application of
Evidence Code section 1161” (p. 1488).

“Appellant testified that she was not working for a pimp at the time of the incident.“ (p. 1488).

“The evidence thus supports the conclusion that the appellant did not solicit prostitution in this
instance “as a result of being a victim of human trafficking.” (Evid.Code, § 1161, subd. (a),
italics added.) The juvenile court accordingly did not err in denying the appellant’s motion to
exclude evidence pursuant to the statute” (p. 1488).

Question 3:
“We hold that Evidence Code section 1161, subdivision (a), applies only when there is specific
casual connection between the person’s status as a victim of human trafficking and the
commission of the commercial sex act at issue. Because, supported by substantial evidence, the
juvenile court found that the appellant was not a victim of human trafficking in relation to the
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solicitation of prostitution at issue here, we conclude that the Evidence Code section 1161 does
not apply, and affirm the juvenile court’s order” (p. 1482).

“The court denied the appellant’s motion to exclude evidence relating to her having solicited a
commercial sex act with Officer Morales. The court reasoned that, when appellant approached
Officer Morales, “she was acting as an independent contractor, nobody threatening her or
threatening to kill her if she doesn’t make money” (p. 1485).

“The juvenile court found true the allegations of the petition filed on February 1, 2013, sustained
the petition, and declared appellant to be a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code section 602. The court removed appellant from the care and custody of her parents, placed
her in the care, custody and control of the probation officer, and ordered her suitably placed. The
court ordered the maximum term of confinement to be 10 months and ordered her to be moved to
Central Juvenile Hall for placement screening. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal” (p.
1485).
Question 4:
“Appellant contends that because she was a victim of human trafficking, the juvenile court erred
in denying her motion under Evidence Code section 1161, subdivision (a), to exclude evidence
that she committed a commercial sex act, namely, the solicitation of prostitution underlying the
wardship petition” (p. 1482).

103
“Appellant testified that she had had a total of approximately 10 pimps. She testified that she
never received any of the money she made and was abused by some or most of the pimps. She
also testified that she was afraid of some of the pimps” (p. 1484).

“Under cross-examination, appellant testified that, on January 31, 2013, the date of her arrest she
did not have a pimp and was living with her *1485 grandmother. Her grandmother was providing
her with food and housing at that time. On the date of the arrest, she left her grandmother’s home
and took a bus to go enroll in school. She made plans to meet her sister after enrolling herself in
school” (p. 1485).

“When asked why she decided to approach Officer Morales, she explained that she saw him
circling the neighborhood. She explained that she was thinking, “ ‘Don’t go to the car; don’t do
it.’ You are better than that.’ But he just kept coming by, so I just decided that I could do
whatever he wanted really quick and then have money in my pocket because I didn’t have any
money.” She agreed that no one forced her to get into the car and that she did not have a pimp, so
she would get to keep the money she made. She had not had a pimp since November 2012” (p.
1485).
Level 1 Analysis Findings #5 – The People, Plaintiff and Respondent v. M.D. (2014)
Question 1:
“*998 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found there was insufficient evidence that the
minor was a victim of human trafficking under the definition set forth in Penal Code section
236.1 and denied the minor’s motion” (p. 998).
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“Because minors are legally incapable of consenting to sexual activity, these minors are victims
of human trafficking whether or not force is used.” (Prop. 35, § 2, as approved by voters Gen.
Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) eff. Nov. 7, 2012.)” (p. 999).

“If the judge is persuaded by the party with the burden of proof, he finds in favor of that party in
regard to the preliminary fact and either admits or excludes the proffered evidence as required by
the rule of law under which the question arises. Otherwise, he finds against that party on the
preliminary fact and either admits or excludes the proffered evidence as required by such
finding.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary com., reprinted at 29B, pt. West’s Ann. Evid.Code (2011
ed.) foll. § 405, pp. 41-42.)” (p. 999).

“In determining whether the normal allocation of the burden of proof should be altered, the
courts consider a number of factors: the knowledge of the parties concerning the particular fact,
the availability of the evidence to the parties, the most desirable result in terms of public policy
in the absence of proof of particular fact, and the probability of the existence or nonexistence of
the fact” (p.1000).
“Thus, for the minor to be found to be a victim of human trafficking, it was necessary for her to
prove that Antonio, the alleged human trafficker, persuaded or attempted to persuade her to
engage in prostitution with the intent “to effect or maintain” a violation of Penal Code section
266i” (p. 1003).

Question 2:
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“*998 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found there was insufficient evidence that the
minor was a victim of human trafficking under the definition set forth in Penal Code section
236.1 and denied the minor’s motion” (p. 998).

“At the conclusion of the jurisdictional hearing, the court found the allegation that the minor
loitered with intent to commit prostitution to be true. At the dispositional hearing, the court
declared the minor a ward of the juvenile court, placed her on probation and ordered her to reside
in her father’s home. Among other probational conditions, the court ordered her to attend school
regularly and “use [her] best efforts in doing well.” The court ordered her “not to be on any
school campus unless you are enrolled there, or unless you are attending events that the
probation officer has approved you attend in advance” (p. 998).

“If the judge is persuaded by the party with the burden of proof, he finds in favor of that party in
regard to the preliminary fact and either admits or excludes the proffered evidence as required by
the rule of law under which the question arises. Otherwise, he finds against that party on the
preliminary fact and either admits or excludes the proffered evidence as required by such
finding.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary com., reprinted at 29B, pt. West’s Ann. Evid.Code (2011
ed.) foll. § 405, pp. 41-42.)” (p. 999).

“In determining whether the normal allocation of the burden of proof should be altered, the
courts consider a number of factors: the knowledge of the parties concerning the particular fact,
the availability of the evidence to the parties, the most desirable result in terms of public policy
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in the absence of proof of particular fact, and the probability of the existence or nonexistence of
the fact” (p. 1000).

“In determining the incidence of the burden of proof, ‘the truth is that there is not and cannot be
any one general solvent for all cases. It is merely a question of policy and fairness based on
experience in the different situations.’ “ (Cal. Law Revision Com. com.29B, pt. 1B, West’s Ann
Evid. Code, supra, (2011 ed.) foll. § 500, p. 310.) The minor argues that section 1161 warrants
reallocation of the burden of proof as a matter of both procedural fairness and public policy” (p.
1000).

“Thus, we find no error in the court’s decision to place the burden of proof on the minor to
establish that she was a victim of human trafficking” (p. 1001).

“We need not evaluate the adequacy of trials counsel’s performance in this case, as the minor has
failed to establish that any such error was prejudicial. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 687 [80 L.Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052] “[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result
of alleged deficiencies.” (Wong v. Bemontes (2009) 558 U.S. 15, 19 [175 L.ed2d 328, 130 S. Ct.
383].)” (p. 1003).

Question 3:
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“*998 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found there was insufficient evidence that the
minor was a victim of human trafficking under the definition set forth in Penal Code section
236.1 and denied the minor’s motion” (p. 998).

“At the conclusion of the jurisdictional hearing, the court found the allegation that the minor
loitered with intent to commit prostitution to be true. At the dispositional hearing, the court
declared the minor a ward of the juvenile court, placed her on probation and ordered her to reside
in her father’s home. Among other probational conditions, the court ordered her to attend school
regularly and “use [her] best efforts in doing well.” The court ordered her “not to be on any
school campus unless you are enrolled there, or unless you are attending events that the
probation officer has approved you attend in advance” (p. 998).

“We disagree. The facts necessary to establish that the minor was a victim of human trafficking
are in fact “peculiarly” within her personal knowledge. She has the most knowledge as to the
circumstances that led her to engage in prostitution, who – if anyone – induced or persuaded her
to do so, and to whom – if anyone – she is reporting or delivering the proceeds of her prostitution
activity. (See, e.g., People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 477 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d
1067]” (p. 1000).

“Thus, we find no error in the court’s decision to place the burden of proof on the minor to
establish that she was a victim of human trafficking” (p. 1001).
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“We need not evaluate the adequacy of trials counsel’s performance in this case, as the minor has
failed to establish that any such error was prejudicial. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 687 [80 L.Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052] “(Wong v. Bemontes (2009) 558 U.S. 15, 19 [175
L.ed2d 328, 130 S. Ct. 383].)” (p. 1003).

Question 4:
“At the conclusion of the jurisdictional hearing, the court found the allegation that the minor
loitered with intent to commit prostitution to be true. At the dispositional hearing, the court
declared the minor a ward of the juvenile court, placed her on probation and ordered her to reside
in her father’s home. Among other probational conditions, the court ordered her to attend school
regularly and “use [her] best efforts in doing well.” The court ordered her “not to be on any
school campus unless you are enrolled there, or unless you are attending events that the
probation officer has approved you attend in advance” (p. 998).

“The minor contends the court erred by placing the burden of proof on her to establish she was a
victim of human trafficking and, alternatively, that even if the burden was hers, the evidence she
presented was sufficient to meet her burden” (p. 999).

“Section 405 provides the evidentiary rules that are applicable when a party moves to withhold
evidence from the jury because it is unreliable or because, as in this case, public policy requires
its exclusion. 3 “Under section 405, the judge first indicates to the parties who has the burden of
proof and the burden of producing evidence on the disputed issue as implied by the rule of law
under which the question arises…. After the judge has indicated to the parties who has the
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burden of proof and the burden of producing evidence, the parties submit their evidence on the
preliminary issue to the judge” (p.999).

“The minor argues that the burden of proof should be allocated to the prosecution because the
prosecution has superior access to evidence bearing on whether she was a victim of human
trafficking and whether she was such a victim is “not a fact peculiarly within [her] personal
knowledge.” She argues that “in a juvenile delinquency case, the government has the clear
advantage in having access to the evidence of the crimes alleged against both the minor and the
purported adult human trafficker. From the start of the case, the prosecution has the initial access
to the police reports and witnesses to support its case” (p. 1000).

“The minor argues that if this court finds there was sufficient evidence she was a victim of
human trafficking, she was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to
introduce additional evidence that she was persuaded by Antonio to go to Concord to prostitute
herself.” (p. 1002-1003).

Question 6:
“In determining whether the normal allocation of the burden of proof should be altered, the
courts consider a number of factors: the knowledge of the parties concerning the particular fact,
the availability of the evidence to the parties, the most desirable result in terms of public policy
in the absence of proof of particular fact, and the probability of the existence or nonexistence of
the fact” (p.1000).
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“Since the minor’s implicit contention is that the evidence supports only the finding that she was
a human trafficking victim, “the question for a review court becomes whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the
question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’
and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it
was insufficient to support a finding.’” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528 [103
CalRptr.3d 538].)” (p. 1002).

“Thus, for the minor to be found to be a victim of human trafficking, it was necessary for her to
prove that Antonio, the alleged human trafficker, persuaded or attempted to persuade her to
engage in prostitution with the intent “to effect or maintain” a violation of Penal Code section
266i” (p. 1003).

Question 7:
“The people of the state of California find and declare: 1. Protecting every person in our state,
particularly our children, from all forms of sexual exploitation is of paramount importance” (p.
998).

Level 1 Analysis Findings # 6 – The People, Plaintiff and Respondent v. N.C. (2016)

Question 1:
“As delinquency judges and advocates, our responsibility is not to punish a person who commits
a crime. It is, rather to rehabilitate and protect those who are under the age of 18 from the
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consequences of their conduct and perhaps get them to a position where they become lawabiding citizens in a way that does not leave them with and enduring or lasting criminal record”
(p. 1243-1244).

“As the court stated, “I think it’s absolutely vital for me and the Court of Appeal to consider the
word ‘criminal.’ The court emphasized that “if the Legislature had decided that [section 1161]
should apply to delinquency proceedings, they could have clearly stated that” (p. 1244).

“The court acknowledged the many similarities between the juvenile justice system and the
criminal justice system, but it was also “mindful of the fact that there are significant differences,
and one of the most important differences is that we adhere to protect [a juvenile] from herself,
so to speak in times of trouble.” (p. 1244).

“The trial court found Evidence Code section 1161 inapplicable in juvenile proceedings because
the evidence inadmissible under the statute is only that offered to prove “criminal liability” and,
as declared in Welfare and Institutions Code 203, “[a]n order adjudging a minor to be a ward of
the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a
proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding” (p. 1244).

“Finally, one of the chief purposes of the CASE Act is to protect minors, as the crime of “human
trafficking” is specifically made applicable to “[a]ny person who causes, induces, or persuades,
or attempts to cause, induce or persuade, a person who is a minor at the time of commission of
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the offense to engage in commercial sex act with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of
[various specified sexual crimes]. (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (c).)” (p. 1245).

“The Attorney General agrees appellant committed the charged offenses “as a result of being a
victim of human trafficking,” but claimed in her brief that this case is not within the ambit of
section 1161 because, as the trial court agreed, appellant was not charged with a “commercial
sexual act,” as defined by Penal Code section 236.21; that is, appellant was charged with an
offense that does not require sexual conduct in return for money or anything else of value.
(People v. Mecamo (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1070, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 519.)” (p. 1246).

“We review the matters of statutory interpretation de novo. (Carver v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc.
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 142, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 569.) Where the issue involves the proper
interpretation of a statute and its application to undisputed facts our review is independent.
(Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group (2002) 29 Cal.4th 345, 357, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 58 P.3d
367.)” (p. 1247).
“Prostitution invariably commences, as it did in this case, with a discussion between the parties
of the sexual activity or activities offered by one party and at what cost to the other party, an
agreement as to the act and reciprocal payment, and conduct indicating a specific intention to
perform the agreement. Because this preludial conduct criminalized by Penal Code section 647,
subdivision (b), has both a commercial and a sexual aspect it may reasonably be thought to
constitute a “commercial sexual act,” or at least an element of such an act, despite the fact that
nothing of value has yet been given or received by any person as compensation for that sexual
conduct” (p. 1248).
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“However, the reasoning of Casas is hardly the only justification for concluding that the phrase
“commercial sexual act” is ambiguous and amenable to interpretation, and that the mere act of
soliciting prostitution may properly be considered a “commercial sexual act” despite the absence
of a completed sexual act” (p. 1248)
“Although Evidence Code section 1161 refers to Penal Code section 236.1, the syntax of the
single sentence that comprises subdivision (a) of section 1161 indicates that the reference to
Penal Code section 236.1 is solely to its definition of “human trafficking” in subdivision (a), (b),
and (c) of that statute; 12 not to its definition in subdivision (h)(2) of “commercial sex act.” The
distinction appears purposeful.” (p. 1248-1249).
“**367 We recognize that Evidence Code section 1161 and Penal Code section 236.1,
subdivision (h)(2), are both provisions of the CASE Act, and the latter statute defines language
very similarly to that used in the former. …But the phrase “commercial sexual act” in section
1161 is not “identical” to the phrase commercial sex act” in the Penal Code section 236.1,
subdivision (h)(2) and, more importantly, the two statutes do not specifically relate to the same
or analogous subject matter.” (p. 1249).

“Persons are rarely arrested for acts of prostitution “on account of which anything of value is
given or received.” (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (h)(2).) Because law enforcement officers may not
themselves engage in sex with suspected prostitutes, let alone compensate them with “anything
of value” (ibid), prostitution is in this state ordinarily punished “as a type of disorderly conduct”
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under Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b). (2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed.
2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, § 76, p. 480.)” (p. 1252).

Question 2:
“A person agrees to engage in an act of prostitution when with specific intent to so engage, he or
she manifests an acceptance of an offer or solicitation to so engage, regardless of whether the
offer or solicitation was made by a person who also possessed the specific intent to engage in
prostitution. No agreement to engage in an act of prostitution shall constitute a violation of this
subdivision unless some act, in addition to the agreement, is done within this state in furtherance
of the commission **359 of an act of prostitution by the person agreeing to engage in that act.”
3

” (p. 1239).

“Before the presentation of the evidence, the district attorney argued that the exclusion of
evidence authorized by section 1161 did not apply to appellant because it only applies to
evidence offered to prove the commission of a “commercial sex act,” and neither petition alleged
she had engaged in any such act.” (p. 1240).

“As delinquency judges and advocates, our responsibility is not to punish a person who commits
a crime. It is, rather to rehabilitate and protect those * 1244 who are under the age of 18 from the
consequences of their conduct and perhaps get them to a position where they become lawabiding citizens in a way that does not leave them with and enduring or lasting criminal record”
(p. 1243-1244).
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“Moving on to the text of section 1161, the trial judge placed great weight on the fact that the
“[e]vidence that a victim of human trafficking … has engaged in any commercial sexual act”
which is excluded by the statute is that which “prove[s] the victim’s criminal liability.” (Italics
added.)” (p. 1244).

“As the court stated, “I think it’s absolutely vital for me and the Court of Appeal to consider the
word ‘criminal.’ The court emphasized that “if the Legislature had decided that [section 1161]
should apply to delinquency proceedings, they could have clearly stated that” (p. 1244).

“The court acknowledged the many similarities between the juvenile justice system and the
criminal justice system, but it was also “mindful of the fact that there are significant differences,
and one of the most important differences is that we adhere to protect [a juvenile] from herself,
so to speak in times of trouble. And so in an effort to prevent [appellant] from become essentially
a revolving door where she gets off the bus at someplace between here and home and reconnects
with a pimp, it’s important for me to adopt a position that [section 1161] can’t absolve her from a
declaration of wardship” (p. 1244).

“Finding section 1161 inapplicable to juvenile proceedings because it refers to “criminal
liability” also ignores the reasoning of In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25
L.Ed.2d 368 as to why the “civil labels” employed in delinquency proceedings, and rehabilitative
goals of the juvenile law, provide no basis upon which to deprive minors of protections
analogous to those conferred by the CASE Act, that would deny them a meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense” (p. 1245).
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“Finally, one of the chief purposes of the CASE Act is to protect minors, as the crime of “human
trafficking” is specifically made applicable to “[a]ny person who causes, induces, or persuades,
or attempts to cause, induce or persuade, a person who is a minor at the time of commission of
the offense to engage in commercial sex act with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of
[various specified sexual crimes]. (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (c).)” (p. 1245).

“Given the extraordinary number of minors trafficked for sexual purposes (see In re M.D., supra,
231 Cal.App.4th at p. 999, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 761; Office of the Attorney **364 General, Cal. Dept.
of Justice, The State of Human Trafficking in California (2012) at pp. 22-26, 48-56 (State of
Human Trafficking) and the policy of the CASE Act to treat these minors as victims, not
criminals (in re Aarica S., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1486, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 136)), the
inapplicability of section 1161 in juvenile proceedings would obstruct one of the chief purposes
of the CASE Act: acknowledgment that minors sexually exploited by human traffickers are not
criminals or delinquents, but victims” (p. 1245).

“The issue before us is whether the “commercial sexual act” referred to in section 1161 is the
same as the “commercial sexual act” defined in Penal Code section 236.1, subdivision (h)(2), or,
as appellant maintains, “commercial sexual act” must be read more expansively as to include
**365 uncompensated sexual conduct punishable under Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b).
As previously indicated, this issue, which is one of first impression, 11 will soon be presented
only in prosecutions in criminal proceedings against an adult *1247 claiming he or she engaged
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in the charged commercial sexual acts “as a result of being a victim of human trafficking.” (§
1161, subd. (a).)” (p. 1246-1247).

“The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion because the victim’s statement reflected her
“willingness to engage in sexual intercourse,” which constituted “sexual conduct” and therefore
fell within the ambit of Evidence Code sections 782 and 1103. (Casas, at p. 895, 226 Cal.Rptr.
285.)” (p. 1248).

“We agree that Casas calls for a more expansive interpretation of the phrase “commercial sex
act” than the construction adopted by the trial court. The phrase contemplates “the practice of
occupation of engaging in sexual activity with someone for payment,” which is the Oxford
English Dictionary definition of “prostitution” (p. 1248).

“Prostitution invariably commences, as it did in this case, with a discussion between the parties
of the sexual activity or activities offered by one party and at what cost to the other party, an
agreement as to the act and reciprocal payment, and conduct indicating a specific intention to
perform the agreement. Because this preludial conduct criminalized by Penal Code section 647,
subdivision (b), has both a commercial and a sexual aspect it may reasonably be thought to
constitute a “commercial sexual act,” or at least an element of such an act, despite the fact that
nothing of value has yet been given or received by any person as compensation for that sexual
conduct” (p. 1248).
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“However, the reasoning of Casas is hardly the only justification for concluding that the phrase
“commercial sexual act” is ambiguous and amenable to interpretation, and that the mere act of
soliciting prostitution may properly be considered a “commercial sexual act” despite the absence
of a completed sexual act” (p. 1248)
“Although Evidence Code section 1161 refers to Penal Code section 236.1, the syntax of the
single sentence that comprises subdivision (a) of section 1161 indicates that the reference to
Penal Code section 236.1 is solely to its definition of “human trafficking” in subdivision (a), (b),
and (c) of that statute; 12 not to its definition in subdivision (h)(2) of “commercial sex act.” The
distinction appears purposeful.” (p. 1248-1249).
“But the phrase “commercial sexual act” in section 1161 is not “identical” to the phrase
commercial sex act” in the Penal Code section 236.1, subdivision (h)(2) and, more importantly,
the two statutes do not specifically relate to the same or analogous subject matter. Penal Code
section 236.1 defines the nature and punishment of various forms of human trafficking, while
section 1161 pertains to the exclusion of evidence in certain prosecutions of a victim of human
trafficking” (p. 1249).

“As indicated, at the present time, almost all persons arrested for prostitution in this state are
charged with violating either Penal Code sections 647, subdivision (b), as was appellant, or
653.22, subdivision (a), 14 which makes it unlawful for any person to loiter in any public place
with the **370 intent to commit prostitution. 15 However, neither of these so called “prostitution
statutes” (see, e.g., In re M.V., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 519), requires
that *1253 “anything of value be given or received.” (§ 236.1, subd. (h)(2).) 16 Therefore, if the
interpretation of section 1161, subdivision (a), urged by the Los Angeles Country District
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Attorney in this case and adopted by the trial court is correct, the CASE Act would provide no
protection at all for victims of human trafficking prosecuted for acts of prostitution they were
forced by traffickers to perform. Such a ridiculous result cannot, of course, be judicially
countenanced” (p. 1253-1253).

Question 3:
“The district attorney opposed the motion on the ground that evidence is inadmissible under
Evidence Code section 1161 only when offered to prove that a victim of human trafficking is
criminally liable for a “commercial sexual act,” and the offense described by subdivision (b) of
Penal Code section 647 is not such an act. According to the district attorney, the phrase
“commercial sexual act” in Evidence Code 1161 is defined by section 236.1, subdivision (h)(2)
of the Penal Code, which states that a “commercial sex act” means “sexual conduct on account
of which anything of value is given or received by any person.” As the district attorney
emphasized, Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b) does not require, and appellant was not
given and did not receive, anything of value as a result of her commission of that offense” (p.
1239).

“Finding that section 1161 does not apply in juvenile proceedings, and that the trial court’s
acceptance of the prosecutor’s interpretation of that statute would virtually wipe out a significant
protection afforded victims of human trafficking by the CASE Act, we shall reverse the
judgment” (p. 1239)
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“On May 28, 2015, 4 the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a wardship petition (Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 602) in case No. PJ51576A (Petition A), alleging that on May 12, appellant, age
17, committed misdemeanor *1240 disorderly conduct by soliciting or agreeing to engage in
prostitution in violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b), and was therefore subject to
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
That same day, the district attorney filed a second petition in case No. PJ51576B (Petition B),
alleging that the appellant committed the same offense on May 27.5 “ (p. 1239-1240).

“The trial court elected to defer ruling on that issue, and proceed with an evidentiary hearing,
because it felt it appropriate to “make a record” with respect to two threshold legal questions: (1)
whether section 1161 applies only in criminal cases and not juvenile proceedings, 7 and (2)
whether, even *1241 if it does apply in juvenile proceedings, it is inapplicable in this case
because, as the district attorney claimed, no evidence shows that appellant engaged in a
“commercial sex act” as defined in Penal Code 236.1, subdivision (h)(2), as meaning “sexual
conduct on account of which anything of value is given or received by any person.” (p. 12401241).

“Although, without objection from the district attorney, the court found the appellant to have
committed the charged acts “as a result of being a victim of human trafficking,” it nevertheless
denied her motion to exclude evidence after concluding that, as matters of law, Evidence Code
section 1161 does not apply to cases such as this, in which the victim of human trafficking did
not actually engage in “sexual conduct on account of which anything of value is given or
received by any person.” (Pen. Code, § 236, subd. (h)(2).)” (p. 1242).
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“*1243 On June 24, after the Los Angeles County Department of Social Services declined to
accept appellant as a client because her family resided in Northern California, the court ordered
the matter transferred to Contra Costa County for disposition 9” (p. 1243).

“The trial court found Evidence Code section 1161 inapplicable in juvenile proceedings because
the evidence inadmissible under the statute is only that offered to prove “criminal liability” and,
as declared in Welfare and Institutions Code 203, “[a]n order adjudging a minor to be a ward of
the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a
proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding” (p. 1244).

“The Attorney General agrees appellant committed the charged offenses “as a result of being a
victim of human trafficking,” but claimed in her brief that this case is not within the ambit of
section 1161 because, as the trial court agreed, appellant was not charged with a “commercial
sexual act,” as defined by Penal Code section 236.21; that is, appellant was charged with an
offense that does not require sexual conduct in return for money or anything else of value.
(People v. Mecamo (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1070, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 519.)” (p. 1246).

“The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion because the victim’s statement reflected her
“willingness to engage in sexual intercourse,” which constituted “sexual conduct” and therefore
fell within the ambit of Evidence Code sections 782 and 1103. (Casas, at p. 895, 226 Cal.Rptr.
285.)” (p. 1248).
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Question 4:
“At the commencement of the jurisdictional hearing, appellant moved under section 1161 to
exclude all evidence sought to be introduced by the district attorney to show that she solicited
acts of prostitution in violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b)” (p. 1239).

“On June 10, appellant moved under section 1161 to exclude all evidence the district attorney
planned to introduce to prove she engaged in commercial sexual acts, because she was a “victim
of human trafficking,” who had been coerced into performing those acts by a pimp who was a
human trafficker within the meaning of Penal Code section 236.1, subdivision (c), which defines
and criminalizes sex trafficking. 6 The motion also claimed that, since **360 the evidence sought
to be excluded consisted solely of the testimony of two undercover police officers regarding the
alleged acts of commercial sex, the petitions should be dismissed after the exclusion of the
officers’ testimony” (p. 1240).

“As delinquency judges and advocates, our responsibility is not to punish a person who commits
a crime. It is, rather to rehabilitate and protect those * 1244 who are under the age of 18 from the
consequences of their conduct and perhaps get them to a position where they become lawabiding citizens in a way that does not leave them with and enduring or lasting criminal record”
(p. 1243-1244).

“We review the matters of statutory interpretation de novo. (Carver v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc.
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 142, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 569.) Where the issue involves the proper
interpretation of a statute and its application to undisputed facts our review is independent.
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(Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group (2002) 29 Cal.4th 345, 357, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 58 P.3d 367.)
Initially, ‘[a]s in any case of statutory interpretation, our task is to determine afresh the intent of
the Legislature by construing in context the language of the statute.” (p. 1247).

Question 5:
“*1243 On June 24, after the Los Angeles County Department of Social Services declined to
accept appellant as a client because her family resided in Northern California, the court ordered
the matter transferred to Contra Costa County for disposition 9” (p. 1243).

Question 6:
“As delinquency judges and advocates, our responsibility is not to punish a person who commits
a crime. It is, rather to rehabilitate and protect those * 1244 who are under the age of 18 from the
consequences of their conduct and perhaps get them to a position where they become lawabiding citizens in a way that does not leave them with and enduring or lasting criminal record”
(p. 1243-1244).

“I think it’s great that [appellant’s] grandparents are willing to take care of her in these uncertain
and difficult times, but as a judge who has observed [appellant’s] history, my biggest concern,
and it’s a concern in all these sorts of cases, is that without court supervision, without becoming
either a 300 or 602 ward, there is no **363 incentive for her to follow through. She has not
reached the maturity level that would satisfy any reasonable judge in believing that she might not
run.” Believing appellant lacks “real adult supervision,” the court stated that “the bottom line is,
without some kind of jurisdiction over the minor, this minor is in serious danger of, well, falling
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by the wayside, whether she runs away, whether she re-engages with one of the pimps that have
been testified about. There is no way for a juvenile judge to protect a minor like this without a
declaration of wardship, without gaining jurisdiction over the minor” (p. 1244).

“The court acknowledged the many similarities between the juvenile justice system and the
criminal justice system, but it was also “mindful of the fact that there are significant differences,
and one of the most important differences is that we adhere to protect [a juvenile] from herself,
so to speak in times of trouble. And so in an effort to prevent [appellant] from become essentially
a revolving door where she gets off the bus at someplace between here and home and reconnects
with a pimp, it’s important for me to adopt a position that [section 1161] can’t absolve her from a
declaration of wardship” (p. 1244).

“Finding section 1161 inapplicable to juvenile proceedings because it refers to “criminal
liability” also ignores the reasoning of In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25
L.Ed.2d 368 as to why the “civil labels” employed in delinquency proceedings, and rehabilitative
goals of the juvenile law, provide no basis upon which to deprive minors of protections
analogous to those conferred by the CASE Act, that would deny them a meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense” (p. 1245).

“Finally, one of the chief purposes of the CASE Act is to protect minors, as the crime of “human
trafficking” is specifically made applicable to “[a]ny person who causes, induces, or persuades,
or attempts to cause, induce or persuade, a person who is a minor at the time of commission of
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the offense to engage in commercial sex act with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of
[various specified sexual crimes]. (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (c).)” (p. 1245).

“Given the extraordinary number of minors trafficked for sexual purposes (see In re M.D., supra,
231 Cal.App.4th at p. 999, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 761; Office of the Attorney **364 General, Cal. Dept.
of Justice, The State of Human Trafficking in California (2012) at pp. 22-26, 48-56 (State of
Human Trafficking) and the policy of the CASE Act to treat these minors as victims, not
criminals (in re Aarica S., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1486, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 136)), the
inapplicability of section 1161 in juvenile proceedings would obstruct one of the chief purposes
of the CASE Act: acknowledgment that minors sexually exploited by human traffickers are not
criminals or delinquents, but victims” (p. 1245).

Question 7:
“I think it’s great that [appellant’s] grandparents are willing to take care of her in these uncertain
and difficult times, but as a judge who has observed [appellant’s] history, my biggest concern,
and it’s a concern in all these sorts of cases, is that without court supervision, without becoming
either a 300 or 602 ward, there is no **363 incentive for her to follow through. She has not
reached the maturity level that would satisfy any reasonable judge in believing that she might not
run.” Believing appellant lacks “real adult supervision,” the court stated that “the bottom line is,
without some kind of jurisdiction over the minor, this minor is in serious danger of, well, falling
by the wayside, whether she runs away, whether she re-engages with one of the pimps that have
been testified about. There is no way for a juvenile judge to protect a minor like this without a
declaration of wardship, without gaining jurisdiction over the minor” (p. 1244).
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Appendix D:
Quotations Selected for Level II Thematic Analysis
Level II Analysis—Emerging Themes:
#1 The People of the State of New York v G.M:
Theme: Relief:
“Based upon the unique circumstances presented here, this court concurs with the People’s
position that all of the defendant’s convictions are entitled to the relief requested. Thus, under the
provisions of the new amendment, this court “must vacate the judgement and dismiss the
accusatory instrument[.]” (CPL 440.10[6].)” (p. 280-281).

Theme: Rehabilitation:
“The passage of this new law was based upon a recognition that “[v]ictims of sex trafficking who
are forced in to prostitution are frequently arrested for prostitution-related offenses and are
saddled with the criminal record. They are blocked from decent jobs and other prospects for
rebuilding their lives. Even after they escape from sex trafficking, the criminal record victimizes
them for life” (Sponsor’s Mem., 2010 N.Y. Assembly Bill A7670). Thus this legislation “would
give victims of human trafficking a desperately needed second chance they [deserve]” (id).” (p.
279).
#2 The People of the State of New York v. Samatha R. :
Theme: Relief:
“In these circumstances, the purposes of the Penal Law, which include providing “an appropriate
public response to particular offenses” (see Penal Law 1.05[5]). Favor an exercise of the criminal
justice system’s mercy-dispensing power to dismiss this prosecution” (p. 6).
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Theme: Rehabilitation:
“Do we really want these teenagers processed in an adult criminal justice system focused on
punishment and incarceration?... where rehabilitative options are limited…where they may be
jailed…where they may be victimized…and where they may be burdened with a criminal record
that bars them from future employment and educational opportunities” (p. 4)?

“Arresting, prosecuting and incarcerating victimized youth serves to re-traumatize them and to
increase their feelings of low self-esteem. This only makes the process of recovery more
difficult” (p. 1).

Theme: Best Interest:
“Fifth, I find that there would be little purpose in imposing a sentence on defendant and that the
effect of any such sentence would do more harm than good” (p. 6).

“The sentencing options in Criminal Court are limited. The likely sentence in a case such as this
would not involve jail. Even if the sentence were a conditional discharge with required
attendance at a counseling program, I see no purpose in imposing such a sentence when the
options available in Family Court, as suggested by the Chief Judge, are likely superior because
of the statutory mandate of considering the child’s “best interests”” (p.6).
“Appropriate services for sexually exploited youth do not exist in the juvenile justice system and
both federal and international law recognize that sexually exploited youth are victims of crime
and should be treated as such” (p. 1).
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“Sexually exploited youth deserve the protection and services of the family court through
processes in place for persons in need of supervision, including diversion, crisis intervention,
counseling, and emergency and long term housing services” (p. 1).

“Nor can I ignore that her continued prosecution in a criminal court may traumatize her to a
greater extent than the prosecution of an adult defendant would affect an adult. These concerns
counsel against continuing a prosecution, no matter how sensitively handled by the District
Attorney, of an individual whom the law alternatively regards a child and an adult or quasi-adult
(see n. 3 supra), and whom the law also calls an “exploited child” and possibly a “victim,”
particularly where another appropriate forum may address the circumstances of her alleged
offense 4” (p. 5).

“I further surmise that the District Attorney may find that maintaining a prosecution against the
alleged teen prostitute might give law enforcement a tool with which to fight trafficking. Yet I
doubt whether any public interest in this regard cannot equally be achieved if this case were
handled in Family rather than Criminal Court” (p. 6).

“Second, the extent of harm caused by the offense is likewise minimal. Although I recognize, as
Judge Richard Weinberg of Midtown Community Court reasoned when he denied a motion
similar to the present (see People v. Lewis, 2010NY03560, NYLJ, decided July 12, 2011, at *1
[Crim Ct, N.Y. County, Weinberg, J.]), that prostitution may negatively impact all participants as
well as the neighborhoods where it occurs, the harm of the violation here is minimal. More
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importantly, I am persuaded that the harm to defendant’s own physical and mental welfare from
the alleged conduct is greater than any societal harm that I can see in this particular case” (p. 5).

“Seventh, I believe that the public’s confidence in the criminal just system will be enhanced by a
dismissal here. The criminal justice system is not always the best venue for addressing societal
problems. Here, the alleged offense-which is not a crime-involves someone who, according to
the Penal Law, is barely an adult, if even that (seen. 3 supra), and who, according to the Social
Services Law, is a “sexually exploited child”’ (p. 6).

#3 The People of the State of New York v. L.G.:
Theme: Relief:
“In People v. G.M., this court left open the question whether CPL 440.10(1)(i) could be applied
to non-prostitution offenses where the People have not consented to vacatur of the resulting
conviction(s). It is not evident from the foregoing analysis of the legislative history behind this
statute, that the legislature’s goal in amending the statute was to avoid punishing the victims of
human trafficking by saddling them with a criminal record. It is also apparent that the legislature
fully expected the statute to provide relief to trafficking victims who were not only arrested for
prostitution or loitering for the purposes of prostitution, but were also convicted of other charges.
Finally, the legislature noted that discretion remains with the court to determine which
convictions should be vacated” (p. 441).

“Trafficked persons should not suffer ongoing punishment for acts they committed unwillingly
under coercion (Id)” (p. 438).
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#4 The People, Plaintiff and Respondent v. Aarica S.:
Theme: Individual Accountability:
“She wasn’t working for anybody or paying anybody any money. I don’t think based upon that
she was a victim of sexual trafficking. And when the incident occurred on the 31st of January,
that she was acting independently on her own with no solicitation or encouragement by anyone
else to get her to do it. I don’t think it has any connection. You would have a much stronger case
at the time she was doing it [if] she was still under the power and under the control of one of
these pimps, but she was not. And it appeared that it was several months before that she wasn’t”
(p. 1485).
“Here the juvenile court found that when appellant solicited prostitution, she was acting as “an
independent contractor” because she was not working for a pimp or giving a pimp the money she
earned at the time. This finding is supported by the evidence and dispenses with application of
Evidence Code section 1161” (p. 1488).

“The court denied the appellant’s motion to exclude evidence relating to her having solicited a
commercial sex act with Officer Morales. The court reasoned that, when appellant approached
Officer Morales, “she was acting as an independent contractor, nobody threatening her or
threatening to kill her if she doesn’t make money” (p. 1485).

“The evidence thus supports the conclusion that the appellant did not solicit prostitution in this
instance “as a result of being a victim of human trafficking.” (Evid.Code, § 1161, subd. (a),
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italics added.) The juvenile court accordingly did not err in denying the appellant’s motion to
exclude evidence pursuant to the statute” (p. 1488).

“Appellant testified that she was not working for a pimp at the time of the incident. She
explained that the reason she approached Officer Morales was that she “could do whatever he
wanted really quick and then have money in [her] pocket because [she] didn’t have any money.”
She agreed that no one forced her to get into the car and that she would get to keep the money
she made because she did not have a pimp at the time “ (p. 1488).

“Here the juvenile court found that when appellant solicited prostitution, she was acting as “an
independent contractor” because she was not working for a pimp or giving a pimp the money she
earned at the time. This finding is supported by the evidence and dispenses with application of
Evidence Code section 1161” (p. 1488).

“The evidence thus supports the conclusion that the appellant did not solicit prostitution in this
instance “as a result of being a victim of human trafficking.” (Evid.Code, § 1161, subd. (a),
italics added.) The juvenile court accordingly did not err in denying the appellant’s motion to
exclude evidence pursuant to the statute” (p. 1488).

“When asked why she decided to approach Officer Morales, she explained that she saw him
circling the neighborhood. She explained that she was thinking, “ ‘Don’t go to the car; don’t do
it.’ You are better than that.’ But he just kept coming by, so I just decided that I could do
whatever he wanted really quick and then have money in my pocket because I didn’t have any
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money.” She agreed that no one forced her to get into the car and that she did not have a pimp, so
she would get to keep the money she made. She had not had a pimp since November 2012” (p.
1485).

#5 The People, Plaintiff and Respondent v. M.D.:
Theme: Individual Accountability:
“The minor suggests that the evidence shows that Antonio was leading her “on the streets in an
area known for prostitution activity, while demonstrating methods for luring potential
customers” and argues that “the police officers’ reasonable belief that Antonio was pimping [the
minor], when they arrested the older woman for that crime,” further supports the inference that
she was a victim of human trafficking. While this evidence might have been sufficient to support
the finding that she was a victim of human trafficking, it does not establish that she was a victim
as a matter of law. The evidence is also consistent with numerous other possibilities, such as that
she and Antonio were merely friends, both of whom voluntarily and on their own initiative were
soliciting prostitution. Neither the fact that Antonio was somewhat older than the minor, nor that
she was arrested for pimping, necessarily compels the conclusion that the minor was a victim of
Antonio’s trafficking. We find no error in the court’s denial of the minor’s motion. 4 “ (p. 1002).

“Thus, for the minor to be found to be a victim of human trafficking, it was necessary for her to
prove that Antonio, the alleged human trafficker, persuaded or attempted to persuade her to
engage in prostitution with the intent “to effect or maintain” a violation of Penal Code section
266i” (p. 1003).
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“At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found there was insufficient evidence that the minor
was a victim of human trafficking under the definition set forth in Penal Code section 236.1 and
denied the minor’s motion” (p. 998).

#6 The People, Plaintiff and Respondent v. N.C.: Rehabilitation & Relief:
Theme: Rehabilitation:
“As delinquency judges and advocates, our responsibility is not to punish a person who commits
a crime. It is, rather to rehabilitate and protect those who are under the age of 18 from the
consequences of their conduct and perhaps get them to a position where they become lawabiding citizens in a way that does not leave them with and enduring or lasting criminal record”
(p. 1243-1244).

Theme: Relief:
“I think it’s great that [appellant’s] grandparents are willing to take care of her in these uncertain
and difficult times, but as a judge who has observed [appellant’s] history, my biggest concern,
and it’s a concern in all these sorts of cases, is that without court supervision, without becoming
either a 300 or 602 ward, there is no incentive for her to follow through. She has not reached the
maturity level that would satisfy any reasonable judge in believing that she might not run.”
Believing appellant lacks “real adult supervision,” the court stated that “the bottom line is,
without some kind of jurisdiction over the minor, this minor is in serious danger of, well, falling
by the wayside, whether she runs away, whether she re-engages with one of the pimps that have
been testified about. There is no way for a juvenile judge to protect a minor like this without a
declaration of wardship, without gaining jurisdiction over the minor” (p. 1244).
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“The court acknowledged the many similarities between the juvenile justice system and the
criminal justice system, but it was also “mindful of the fact that there are significant differences,
and one of the most important differences is that we adhere to protect [a juvenile] from herself,
so to speak in times of trouble. And so in an effort to prevent [appellant] from become essentially
a revolving door where she gets off the bus at someplace between here and home and reconnects
with a pimp, it’s important for me to adopt a position that [section 1161] can’t absolve her from a
declaration of wardship” (p. 1244).

“Finally, one of the chief purposes of the CASE Act is to protect minors, as the crime of “human
trafficking” is specifically made applicable to “[a]ny person who causes, induces, or persuades,
or attempts to cause, induce or persuade, a person who is a minor at the time of commission of
the offense to engage in commercial sex act with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of
[various specified sexual crimes]. (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (c).)” (p. 1245).

